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Abstract
This paper aims at clarifying the nature of Frege’s system of logic, as presented in the first volume of the
Grundgesetze. We undertake a rational reconstruction of this system, by distinguishing its propositional
and predicate fragments. This allows us to emphasise the differences and similarities between this system
and a modern system of classical second-order logic.
1 Preliminaries and proposals
The primary aim of Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik ([18]) was to set up a formal system, that he
called ‘Begriffsschrift’ (FGGBS, from now on)1, within which it should have been possible to get both a
formal theory of natural numbers, and a formal theory of real numbers. Frege’s purpose was to obtain these
theories by adding the appropriate explicit definitions to such a system2. To make this possible, he included
in FGGBS two axioms dealing with value-ranges of functions—the infamous Basic Law V and the Basic
Law VI, involving, together with extensions, Frege’s operator of definite description—and based on them to
explicitly define a two-argument first-level function—the function ξ _ ζ, in Frege’s notation—, conceived
in order to dispense with higher-level functions3. Frege considered these ingredients of his system to be
perfectly logical in nature. Hence, he did not present his whole system as resulting from the addition of
non-logical axioms and definitions to an underlying system of logic, independent both of value-ranges and of
definite descriptions, provided by the remaining axioms—the Basic Laws I, IIa, IIb, III, and IV—together
∗We thank, for valuable remarks, suggestions, and other sorts of support: Francesca Boccuni, Abele Lassale Casanave,
Annalisa Coliva, Pieranna Garavaso, Gerhard Heinzmann, Gregory Landini, Paolo Mancosu, Dag Prawitz, Philippe de Rouilhan,
Julien Ross, Marco Ruffino, Matthias Schirn, Franc¸ois Schmitz, Andrea Sereni, Go¨ran Sundholm, Jamie Tappenden, Gabriele
Usberti and two anonymous referees. When we quote a translation from Frege’s works, we feel free to slightly modify it, if this
allows to stay closer to Frege’s original text.
1This system results from a revision and extension of the system previously presented in Frege’s 1879 booklet titled in same
way ([14]). To avoid any confusion, we shall use, here, the acronym ‘FGGBS’ (for ‘Frege Grundgesetze Begriffsschrift ’) to refer
only to the former system. We use the whole word ‘Begriffsschrift ’ (in italic) to refer to the 1879 booklet.
2Notice, however, that whereas the theory of natural numbers should have merely required appropriate definitions, since
those should have been enough for warranting the existence of these numbers, that of real numbers should have also required
an existence proof for domains of magnitudes (these numbers being identified by Frege with ratios of magnitudes), since their
existence would have not been warranted by their definition ([38]; [12], ch. 22; [37]; [39]).
3In Frege’s parlance—which we shall also adopt here—first-level functions are those whose arguments are required to be
objects, while n-level functions (n = 2, 3, . . .) are those whose arguments are required to be n − 1-level functions. As it will
become clear later, Frege employed functions where we would rather employ predicates. Hence, his first-level functions often
work, mutatis mutandis, as first-level predicates, and higher-level functions as higher-level predicates.
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with a number of deductive rules. Even though this underlying system can be easily identified and is close to
the one that Frege had offered some years earlier in his booklet Begriffsschrift4—which involves, indeed, no
analogue of Basic Laws V and VI and makes, then, no mention of value-ranges and of definite descriptions—,
in the Grundgesetze, he made no effort to separate, within his theories of natural and real numbers, what
depends on laws V and VI from what is, instead independent of them, and, thus, of value-ranges and
definite descriptions. On the contrary, he pervasively used the function ξ _ ζ to avoid the appeal to higher-
level functions, even when this use would have dispensed him from appealing to value-ranges and definite
descriptions. These play, then, a pervasive role in Frege’s deductions, often without intrinsic necessity5.
Despite this, we know, that, whereas the whole FGGBS is provably inconsistent, the subsystem provided
by Basic Laws I, IIa, IIb, III and IV, together with the corresponding deductive rules is not, and it is
in many respects analogous to a modern system of full second-order predicate logic. This analogy goes
with a number of important differences, however. The purpose of our paper is to emphasise some of these
differences, by suggesting a reconstruction of such a subsystem, which is intended to both follow the modern
usual standards of exposition, and to be faithful to Frege’s conceptions, especially in what makes them
contrast with other conceptions, nowadays quite standard and on which modern systems of predicate logic
are based. This double intent makes our purpose distinct from that of a number of other presentations and
critical discussions of Frege’s conceptions and systems of logic (which the reader can find, for example, in
[42], [12], [5], [35], [1], [25], [31]).
The adoption of modern standards of exposition apart, there are, however, some important differences
between our reconstruction and Frege’s original presentation.
One of them pertains to our focusing on a fragment of Frege’s whole system, to which he does not seem to
have been willing to assign a distinct role6. This goes together with our distinction between a propositional
and a second-order system. Moreover this distinction does not correspond to any distinction that Frege
would have emphasised in the Grundgesetze. Though many of the arguments and considerations included
in the first part of this treatise ([18], §§ I.1-I.52)7 are inescapably propositional in nature, he was, in fact,
unconcerned, both in this part, and in the successive ones, with a clear identification of a propositional
fragment of his whole system. Comparing the Grundgesetze with the Begriffsschrift could certainly offer
another picture, since the system offered in the latter does not only involve, as we have said above, neither
value-ranges nor definite descriptions, but also includes a propositional fragment which is much more easily
separable from the whole system. Still, it seems important to us to notice that in the Grundgesetze, to which
we shall here limit our attention, things go otherwise.
Another often mentioned radical difference between Frege’s conception of logic and our own depends on
his not making a clear separation between the syntax of his system and the meaning to be attributed to
the symbols involved in it. As it has been often remarked, this results in his interweaving syntactical and
4Cf. footnote 1, above. Though there are many relevant differences between the two systems, we avoid this matter here, and
rather limit our attention to the (more mature) system of the Grundgesetze, namely FGGBS.
5On the eliminability of the appeal to value-ranges from many of Frege’s deductions in the Grundgesetze, cf. [24], pp. 581-584,
and [25], § 6.1. Notice, however, that eliminating value-ranges would often require the appeal to functions of third or even higher
level, which results in formulas that have not a plain rendering within a second-order predicate language.
6Notice, however, that in the Foreword to the Grundgesetze, Frege remarks that a “dispute [Streit ]” about the logical nature
of his derivations “can arise only concerning my basic law of value-range (V)” and continues as follows: “I take it to be purely
logical. At any rate, the place is hereby marked where there has to be a decision ” ([18], Vorwort, pp. VII; [22], p. VI1). This
seems to suggest that Frege deemed questionable the logical nature of Basic Law V (and VI), or, at least, considered it less
certain than that of his other laws.
7This part is plainly titled ‘Exposition [Darlegung ] of the Begriffsschrift ’. It contains an informal presentation of Frege’s
system, namely its language, its Basic Laws (or axioms), its deductive rules, and its basic (explicit) definitions. The remaining
part of the Grundgesetze (with the exception of §§ II.55-II.164, offering a critical discussion of some alternative definitions of
real numbers and advancing the desiderata that a suitable definition should have met, according to Frege) are devoted to prove
theorems within this very system.
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semantic aspects (at least with respect to the usual modern conception of the distinction between syntax
and semantics). Though our reconstruction will largely reflect this attitude, we shall not insist on this well-
known feature of Frege’s exposition. This is only an aspect of a more general attitude with regard to the
nature and role both of logic and of formal languages, which we shall not focus on, though we hope that the
discussion on this matter, quite intense at present, could benefit from the reconstruction we offer. In fact,
our reconstruction is so conceived as to make its syntactical ingredients easily identifiable, so as to allow
to separate them from the semantic ones. Doing this would result in a rendering of the purely syntactical
features of Frege’s system. It is noteworthy that this rendering would stand on its own. This shows that
Frege’s interweaving syntactical and semantic aspects does not result in making the former intrinsically
dependent on the latter. Their actual dependence only pertains to Frege’s own way of looking at them,
which our reconstruction is intended to reflect.
For this purpose, it seems to us indispensable to begin with a discussion of Frege’s notion of a function,
aiming both at setting some relevant features of this notion and at emphasising the basic role it is intended to
play in FGGBS8. This will also be the occasion to emphasise some relevant aspects of this system. This is the
purpose of § 2. The next two §§ are instead devoted to our reconstruction: § 3 focuses on the propositional
fragment of FGGBS, § 4 focuses on its second-order one.
2 Frege’s Notion of a Function and Other Related Aspects of FGGBS
2.1 The Historical Background
Frege presented FGGBS as a general theory of objects and functions. He did not only suggest to replace,
as he had already done in the Begriffsschrift ([14], p. VII), the subject/predicate duality, on which logic
had been classically based before him, with the argument/function duality, but he also claimed that “objects
stand opposed to functions”, declared to “count as objects everything that is not a function” ([18], § I.2, p. 7;
[22], p. 71), and identified logical constants themselves with appropriate functions. In short, he grounded
not only the presentation of his system, but also his very conception of it, on the notion of a function in its
opposition to that of an object. This depends on his adopting a peculiar view of the nature of functions.
Many aspects of this view are left implicit in the Grundgesetze. Others are set fourth, instead, in the same
time as FGGBS is expounded. An example is the remark with which Frege opened his treatise (Foreword
and Introduction apart: [18], § I.1, p. 5; [22], p. 51):
If the task is to give the original reference [Bedeutung ] of the word ‘function’ as used in math-
ematics, then it is easy to slip into calling a function of x any expression [Ausdruck ] that is
formed from ‘x’ and certain determinate numbers by means of the notations [Bezeichnungen]
for sum, product, power, difference, etc. This is inappropriate [unzutreffend ], since it presents
[hingestellt ] the function as an expression, since in this way a function is depicted [hingestellt ] as
an expression, as a combination of signs [Verbindung von Zeichen], and not as what is designated
[Bezeichnete] thereby9. One will therefore be tempted to say ‘reference of an expression’ instead
of ‘expression’.
8For a more comprehensive discussion of Frege’s notion of a function, cf. [33]. This last paper is intended to contribute to a
large recent discussion on the topic, for which, cf., among others: [27], [10], [26], [3], [4], [7], [36], [9].
9Though is seems sometimes that Frege was using the verbs ‘to designate [bezeichnen]’ and ‘to refer [bedeuten]’ as synonymous
(cf, for example, [18], Vorwort, p. IX; [22], p. IX1), we shall use them with a different meaning: we shall say that a name refers,
to mean that there is something which it is the name of, and that it designates something, if it is the name of such a something
(so that saying that a name refers to x is intended to mean that it designates x and x exists).
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It is not clear who or what Frege had precisely in mind in advancing this warning. But it is a matter of
(historical) fact that this warning can be read as a reproach to many 18th-century mathematicians, which
had, instead, openly defined functions as expressions. A relevant example is Lagrange, whose The´orie des
fonctions analytiques includes the following definition ([30], § 1; [28], Introduction, p. 1):
One calls ‘function’ of one or several quantities any expression of calculation [expression de calcul ]
into which these quantities enter in any way whatsoever combined or not with other quantities
which are regarded as having same given and invariable values, whereas the quantities of the
function may receive any possible value.
This definition is quite surprising for us, since it seems not only to interweave, but rather to mix-up the
syntactic level of expressions with the semantic level of quantities: how can, indeed, a quantity properly enter
an expression? Accounting for the rationale of Lagrange’s definition is outside the scope of the present paper
(for this matter, we refer the reader to [13]). It would be enough to say that this definition was intended to
be shaped so as to assign to functions a basic role in mathematics. The relevant expressions were conceived
as manifestations of the operational relations induced by the arithmetical formalism appropriately extended
and generalised—this same formalism that Frege was referring to when speaking of “notations for sum,
product, power, difference, and so on”. The quantities entering these expressions were conceived, in turn,
as “algebraic quantities” ([30], § 5; [28], Introduction, p. 3), that is, quantities fully determined by their
being relata of certain particular relations of this sort ([13], pp. 99-100 and § 2). Hence, taking functions to
be expressions into which quantities enter was a way to present functions as the object matter of a theory
studying the operational relations induced by such a formalism. Lagrange’s main foundational idea was to
consider such a theory as the base on which the whole mathematics should have been erected.
Rejecting the identification of functions with expressions was then, for Frege, a way for rejecting the idea
that mathematics should have been reduced to a mere combinatorial game within a given formalism. For
him, providing formal theories of natural and real numbers was a legitimate purpose—better an indispensable
task to be achieved in order to get an appropriate foundation for mathematics—just insofar as the formalism
involved in these theories was intended to have a content, though a logical content. A formal expression
was then, for him, nothing but a way to appropriately express this content, and Lagrange’s mistake, he
would have argued, consisted in taking the form in which the content is expressed as the subject matter of
mathematics, whereas mathematics (and logic) cannot but be concerned with the content itself.
By making this criticism, Frege was perfectly in line with the reaction of many 19th-century math-
ematicians against Lagrange’s foundational program, a reaction emblematically represented by Cauchy’s
opposition to “arguments drawn from the generality of algebra” ([6], p. ii; [2], p. 1). Still, this reaction also
brought mathematicians to abstain from taking the notion of a function as the deepest conceptual ground on
which mathematics should have been raised. The so-called program of arithmetization of analysis, mainly
promoted by Cauchy, was, indeed, based on the idea that functions were to be defined on numbers, that
is, conceived as laws connecting numbers to numbers. So conceived, the notion of a function became con-
ceptually dependent on that of appropriate domains of numbers, namely real and complex numbers; it did
not only lose its foundational centrality, but it also became unsuitable to enter a non circular definition of
numbers. Hence, Frege could have certainly not conceived the notion of a function in this way and still
grounded his whole foundational program on it.
In the very same years during which he was elaborating and partially realising this program, a new
perspective was appearing, thanks to the work of Cantor and Dedekind. The first tentative steps in the
elaboration of a theory of sets was suggesting, indeed, the possibility of explaining the notion of a function
within a more general context than that provided by a theory of real and/or complex numbers, namely by
conceiving a function as a law connecting a set to a set. But Frege could not have followed this path, since,
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for him, the notion of a set required a clarification based on that of a function10, and, indeed, his own quite
wispy sketch of a theory of sets is actually based on the identification of sets with value-ranges of appropriate
functions, namely concepts and relations.
2.2 The Paradox of Functions
So, what could have been a function for Frege? Despite his distinction between an expression and what
is (purportedly) designated by it, Frege does not say explicitly (either in § I.1 or in other places of the
Grundgesetze) that a function is that which an appropriate expression (purportedly) designates. In “Function
und Begriff”, he even explicitly denies that a function is the reference of a “mathematical expression”, since,
he argues, if it were so, “it would just be a number” ([16], p. 5; [21], p. 23). Thus, even if there is no
doubt that, for Frege, functions were designated by appropriate expressions and that these expressions work
as function-names—and are explicitly referred to as such (‘Functionsname’, in German)11—and also that,
for him, recognising such different expressions went together with recognising different functions (at least
for expressions differing from each other under appropriate respect), it does not seem that he would have
been inclined to consider the problem solved by merely saying that functions are that which appropriate
expressions designate.
In U¨ber Begriff und Gegenstand, while dealing with the paradox of the concept horse ([17], pp. 195-
199), Frege evoked what he ha written, some years earlier, in a footnote of the Grundlagen, namely that
“a concept [. . . ] is a possible predicate of a singular judgement-content, an object a possible subject of the
same” ([15], § 66, footnote (**), p. 77; [20], p. 77), then he claimed that, despite having become aware, in
the meantime, of the sense/reference distinction, his view had remained “essentially the same”, namely that
“taking ‘subject’ and ‘predicate’ in the linguistic sense: a concept is the reference of a predicate; an object
something that can never be the whole reference of a predicate, but can be the reference of a subject” ([17],
pp. 198; [21], pp. 47-48). This claim cannot be taken, however, as a positive definition of concepts, and this
because of what it asserts: the sentence ‘a concept is the reference of a predicate’ has the form of a sentence
expressing a subject-predicate judgement, namely ‘s is P ’, and, in agreement with this very claim, ‘s’ can
only designate an object, not a concept. This is a version of the paradox, indeed.
To clarify his notion of a function, Frege considered, in § I.1 of the Grundgesetze the example of a




x, and argued that its “essence [Wesen]” depends on the
“connection” that it establishes between the numbers put in place of ‘x’ and the numbers which result when
this is done12. Then, he claimed that for an expression to be appropriate to designate a function, it has to
be “in need of completion, unsaturated”, that is, it has to involve some signs used to “hold places open” for
other signs, and added that the essence of a function designated by a certain expression lies in the “particular
type of need of completion” manifested by this expression. Finally, he concluded that a function is in itself
unsaturated.
This makes the paradox even sharper, since, if in a phrase like ‘the concept Φ (ξ)’, one replaces ‘ξ’ with
an object-name, let us say ‘∆’, one gets the phrase ‘the concept Φ(∆)’, which is openly awkward, since, if
‘Φ (ξ)’ is a function-name, ‘Φ(∆)’ is the name of a value of a function, which is an object, according to Frege.
It would thus be odd to admit that this phrase includes an empty space, and is then unsaturated13.
10Frege is quite explicit on this point in the Introduction to the Grundgesetze ([18], Einleitung, pp. 2-3).






12As a matter of fact, Frege rejected any limitation to the domain of his functions. Hence, to say that a function is numerical,
that is, only admits numbers as arguments, is quite inappropriate, according to his view. Still, we are here at the very beginning
of the treatise and he seems to have felt free to fall into this impreciseness, which is signalled, by the way, by his following
mathematicians in writing ‘x’ instead of ‘ξ’, as recommended by him just some lines later.
13This is also what is suggested by Frege’s mention of the paradox in the Grundgesetze ([18], § I.4, footnote (1), p. 8; [22],
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Hence, speaking of need of completion and unsaturation does not solve the problem: despite the several
occurrences of the term ‘essence’, there is nothing in the considerations offered in § I.1 of the Grundgesetze
which is appropriate to provide an explicit and clear response to the frank question: what is a function?
And, as a matter of fact, in the Grundgesetze such an explicit response is not offered at all. And, it cannot
be offered, in fact, since any sentence like ‘a function is a . . . ’ is a sentence of the form ‘s is P ’, where ‘s’
cannot but designate an object, as said above.
No doubt, according to Frege, the crucial feature of a function lies in its power to associate arguments
and values in a certain way. But what are arguments, what are values, and how can this way be identified?
If an expression, belonging to an already established language—that of the theory of real numbers, for





x14. But how to answer these questions in general, without relying on a
previous language and on the ontology associated with it? In the face of this difficulty, Frege seems to have
no other resource than appealing to some metaphors, like those of holding places open, of need completion,
or of being unsaturated. But, these are just metaphors. Grasping what Frege was willing to communicate
through them requires, as Frege himself said, “a grain of salt” ([17], p. 204; [21], p. 54). The next § expounds
what our grain of salt suggests as an interpretation of Frege’s ideas (for a better articulation and justification
of what follows, we refer the reader to [33]).
2.3 Frege’s Expository Language and the Role of Function-Names in FGGBS
Claiming truth or falsehood is, for Frege, the same as claiming something about objects, since truth pertains
to how objects are. Hence, insofar as logic “deals [...] with being true”([18], Vorwort, p. XV; [22], p. XV1),
in logic one cannot but speak of objects, or, better, logic cannot but be concerned with the ways of claiming
something about objects. It follows that the only names to be included as such in the language of logic,
namely in the language to be used in FGGBS, are object-names. Function-names occur within it only
through the names of their values (which are object-names, as we have said above), that is, as matrices
whose completion has resulted in (non-atomic) object-names, and can, then, be recognised in such names
as an incomplete part of them. This is an implicit presence, then, so to say. But it is both pervasive and
essential, since logic has to do with something’s being true, not insofar as it deals with this or that particular
object about which truth or falsehood are claimed, but rather insofar as it deals with the mere form of
our claiming truth or falsehood, which, for Frege, is the same as saying that it is the general study of the
different ways of naming “the True [das Wahre]” and “the False [das Falsche]” ([18], Vorwort, p. X; [22],
p. X1). The True and the False are objects, indeed, for Frege, namely logical objects. Better, they are the
two only elementary logical objects, epistemically speaking: any other logical object is designated in terms of
its relations with them. And the different ways of naming the True and the False manifest different functions
at work, since the different names of the True and the False are obtained by completion from the names of
these functions.
Both for forming the (non-atomic) names of the True and the False to be used in FGGBS, and for defining
other logical objects—which reduces, in fact, to get appropriate non-atomic names of them—, as well as for
p. 81):
There is a difficulty [. . . ] which can easily obscure the true state of affairs and thereby arouse suspicion concerning
the correctness of my conception. If we compare the expression ‘the truth-value of ∆’s falling under the concept
Φ (ξ)’ with ‘Φ (∆)’, then we see that the ‘Φ()’ really corresponds to ‘the truth-value of ()’s falling under the concept
Φ (ξ)’, and not to ‘the concept Φ (ξ)’. So the latter words do not really designate a concept (in our sense), even
though the linguistic form makes it look as if they do.
14Cf. footnote (12), above.
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forming statements in this system, Frege appeals to a number of basic functions working as logical constants.
Both the relevant (non-atomic) names of the True and the False, and those of these other logical objects
are, indeed, either names of values of these elementary functions, or names obtained from the names of these
functions and of their values, according to a complex procedure, which we shall try to explain as clearly
as possible in our reconstruction (namely in §§ 3.2 and 4.3, above). Statements are formed, instead, as we
shall see later, by appropriately transforming the names of the True and the False, according to another
procedure, which we shall also try to explain (namely in §§ 3.3 and 4.5, above).
These basic functions, as well as any other obtained from them, enter FGGBS just insofar as this
system—or better, its language—involves names of their values, or statements obtained from these names.
In agreement with what we have said above, this language does not involve, indeed, expressions designating
functions as such. In other words, no well-formed string of symbols in FGGBS designates a particular func-
tion, while, as we shall see later, some appropriate (atomic) symbols are used in it to “indicate [andeuten]”
(which, for Frege, is quite different from designating: cf. [18], §§ I.1, I.8, I.17; [22], pp. 51, 111, 311-321)
functions in general.
But then, where do function-names occur? The answer is that they occur within another language. By
insisting on one or another of the roles that Frege assigns to it, this other language could be assimilated
either to a preliminary language with respect to the language of FGGBS, or to a metalanguage whose
object-language is, again, the language of FGGBS 15. For short, we call this language, ‘Frege’s expository
language’16. This language is used, indeed, to expound FGGBS, namely to introduce the language of this
last system, defining its basic functions, and justifying its axioms and deductive rules. In this language,
functions are named through unsaturated expressions, involving the appropriate lower-case Greek letters,
like ‘ξ’, ‘ζ’, or ‘ϕ’, which are not used to designate something, but merely to hold places open for the names
of the arguments of these functions, that is, either for object-names, if these functions are first-level, or for
other function-names, if these functions are higher-level. Among these unsaturated expressions, some atomic
ones are used to name the basic functions. This is for example the case of ‘ξ = ζ’, the name of the identity
function, where ‘ξ’ and ‘ζ’, hold places open for object-names (since, this is a first level-function). Whatever
such an unsaturated expression might be, filling all of its open places (that is, replacing the lower-case Greek
letters used to hold these places open with names of appropriate arguments) results in transforming it into
an object-name, the name of a value of the relevant function.
It is to understand some statements of Frege’s expository language, namely those involving function-
names, or better to grasp the content that these statements are intended to communicate, that one has
to have recourse to a grain of salt. This means that Frege’s expository language is not purely declarative,
being rather evocative, so to say, at least partially: it is used to transmit a content that a purely declarative
language can hardly transmit, because of the paradox mentioned above. The grain of salt is required to
disregard the paradox, and to understand the content that is to be transmitted by speaking of functions
as such, either in general, or with respect to particular ones. Let us better explain ourselves. We label
‘declarative’ a language whose purpose is claiming truth or falsehood. This is the case of the language of any
science, and, in particular, of the very language of FGGBS. We label, instead, ‘evocative’ a language whose
purpose is to transmit ineffable content, for example communicating emotions or transferring some sorts of
know-how. Our point is that Frege’s expository language is evocative insofar as it is used to teach how the
declarative language of FGGBS is to be used, since teaching this know-how requires speaking of functions
as such, and, according to Frege’s view on them, functions are just things of which one cannot speak of as
such, without being victim of a paradox, if what is said about them is to be understood as a claim of a
15Note, however, that the frank distinction between language and metalanguage, and, then, the very notion of a metalanguage,
are far from having been grasped by Frege, and are in many respects at odd with his universalist conception of logic (cf. p. 11,
below), with the result that merely taking this other language to be a metalanguage is not faithful to his conceptions.
16Cf. footnote (17), below.
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declarative language. Hence, admitting that understanding Frege’s expository language requires a grain of
salt, is just the same, in our parlance, as meaning that this language is evocative. Moreover, arguing that
teaching how the declarative language of FGGBS is to be used requires speaking of functions is the same as
meaning that using an evocative language is indispensable to prepare oneself to understand the declarative
language of FGGBS17. It is only in such an evocative language that, in agreement with Frege’s conceptions
of them, functions can be named as such. This is done by using unsaturated names—that is expressions
involving symbols used for holding places open for other appropriate names—in a context in which these
places are just not to be filled up, since filling them would transform these expressions in object-names and
would bring, then, to awkwardnesses (like it happens when the phrase ‘the concept Φ (ξ)’, is transformed
in ‘the concept Φ(∆)’). In the declarative language of FGGBS, functions are, instead, pervasively shown at
work, under the cloths of names of their values, but they are never named as such, that is, never shown, in
their own cloths.
Among the statements of Frege’s expository language that have to be understood to prepare oneself
to understand the formulas of FGGBS, there are those providing the definition of the basic functions of
this last system. Providing such a definition consists in fixing the values that these functions take for any
argument. In order to do this, Frege uses two atomic names for the True and the False—namely the name
‘True [Wahre]’ and ‘False [Falsche]’—, and feels free both to carelessly appeal to the totality of objects,
and to use appropriate letters, namely some upper-case Greek letters, as indeterminate object-names, i.e.
names of unspecified objects. As a matter of fact, Frege seems to also implicitly appeal—just as carelessly,
or even more so—to totalities of functions, like the totality of one-argument first-level functions, that of
two-arguments first-level function, that of one-argument second-level functions whose argument is a one-
argument first-level function, and so on, and uses other appropriate letters, namely other upper-case Greek
letters, to form indeterminate function-names, i.e. names of unspecified functions. However, a totality of
functions does not seem to be, for him, a domain of entities given as such, as it is the case for the totality
of objects, but rather a space of possible functions obtained from the basic ones by appropriate means, or
possibly introduced by appropriately extending the language of FGGBS18.
This short account of the purpose and features of Frege’s expository language should be enough to clarify
17The indispensability of a preparatory stage in the understanding of logic, according to Frege’s conception, has often been
pointed out by speaking of elucidation (Erla¨uterung), for example by Weiner in [40], ch. 6, and [41], pp. 58-61. The term
‘Erla¨uterung ’ appears only marginally in the Grundgesetze, without a clear defined meaning ([18] , §§ I.1, footnote (1), and
I.34-35), as well as in U¨ber Begriff und Gegenstand ([17], p. 193). Still the idea that is generally associated with this term is
expressed, by means of the term ‘exposition [Darlegung ]’, in the following passage from the Introduction of the Grundgesetze
([18], Einleitung, pp. 3-4; [22], pp. 31-41):
Such an auxiliary means is my Begriffsschrift [namely the system FGGBS: cf. footnote (1), above], whose exposition
will be my first task. [. . . ] It will not always be possible to give a proper [regelrecht ] definition of everything, simply
because our ambition has to be to reduce matters to what is logically simple, and this as such allows no proper
[eigentlich] definition. In such a case, I have to make do with gestering at what I mean.
This justifies our calling ‘expository’ the language Frege used for this purpose.
18The question whether Frege admitted, or even grasped a notion assimilable to the modern notion of an arbitrary function,
extensionally understood—i.e. the notion of an arbitrary appropriate subset of a set of appropriate ordered pairs (for example,
an arbitrary subset of the set of ordered pairs of elements of the relevant domain D of individuals, including one and only one
such pair 〈x, y〉 for any element x of D, in the case of one-argument first-level functions)—has been the object of the discussion
mentioned in footnote (8). The claim that a totality of functions is, for Frege, a space of possible functions obtained by an
appropriate procedure takes side in this discussion, according to the views defended in [33]. We refer the reader to this paper
for a justification of this claim. In the present paper, we confine ourselves to account for the procedures admitted within the
propositional and the second-order fragments of FGGBS for generating terms conceived as names of values of functions. Though
crucial for an assessment both of Frege’s conception of logic and of the meaning he assigned to the statements of FGGBS, the
question of how he conceived his totalities of functions is, indeed, scarcely relevant to understand the way this system and, in
particular, these fragments of it, work, which is the only question we want to focus on, in the present paper.
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the fact that, though rooted in a natural one, this language crucially appeals to special symbols, used for a
specified purpose, and introduced for this, according to appropriate stipulations. This is, then, a partially
artificial language. This is why we have decided to include an account of this language, better of its artificial
features, within our reconstructions of the propositional and second-order fragments of FGGBS. We shall
use a trick for this purpose: instead of fixing the language of our renderings of these fragments at once,
we shall proceed by steps, beginning with the construction of some preliminary formal languages, some
elements of which will be discarded in the end, and will not be included, then, in the final formal languages
of these renderings, namely the languages used to form their well-formed formulas (as it will be clear above,
the way we shall proceed, and the relation connecting these preliminary languages with the final ones will
be crucially different in the cases of our rendering of the propositional and of the second-order fragments
of FGGBS). Still, this will not dispense us from passing through an even more preliminary stage, in our
reconstructions, where natural language, enriched with appropriate symbols informally introduced so as to
form names both for the basic functions and for their values (and, then, open to paradox, in agreement with
Frege’s conceptions), will be used to define these same functions. The symbols obtained from their names,
by omitting the lower-case Greek letters occurring within them to hold places open for their arguments, will
then be included alone, under the form of functional constants, both in our preliminary formal languages
and in the final ones. This allows us to avoid oddity with respect to the usual modern standards, but it
is, strictly speaking, unfaithful to Frege’s conceptions (since nothing assimilable to such constants has any
place in his presentation, where these symbols only occur endowed with appropriate letters, unless when
they merely refer to themselves as pure signs, as it happens in § I.6, for the symbol of negation).
2.4 Terms, Statements, and Truth
Another thing that should be clear from what has been said up to now is that Frege admitted no principled
distinction between truth-values (namely the True and the False) and the objects about which one can
claim truth or falsehood. The former are nothing but two particular objects, living in the same realm as
any other object, without any distinction of status or type. This goes together with not considering terms
as categorically distinct from statements in FGGBS: a statement is obtained by letting a special symbol
precede either a name of a truth-value, or an expression obtained by appropriately transforming such a
name (cf. p. 7, above). This special symbol is ‘ ’ ([18], § I.5): letting it precede the name of a truth-value
results in the statement that the truth-value named by this name is the True; letting it precede an expression
obtained by appropriately transforming such a name results in the statement that the truth-value named by
whatever name resulting from this expression by coming back to a name of a truth-value (in an appropriate
way, again) is the True. This means that the act of asserting something, or claiming truth or falsehood is
rendered, within FGGBS, as the act of holding that a certain appropriate term, or all the terms of a class
of appropriate terms refer to the True19. This makes two things clear.
The first is that the True and the False are not merely conceived by Frege as two distinct designated
objects whatsoever, but as two peculiar objects having a precise intrinsic nature.
The second is that a statement of FGGBS could be properly said to be true or false only if it were
admitted that this means that it embodies a reference to the True or to the False, so to say, which is not
what is usually understood when it is said of a statement of a natural language that is true or false. Nothing
would prevent one from adopting this parlance as a convenient convention, but it is a fact that, after having
used the adjectives ‘true [wahr ]’ and ‘false [falsch]’ freely enough in the Foreword of the Grundgesetze, Frege
was quite cautious in using them in the following parts of his treatise, where they appear very seldom and
19The role of functions in this rendering appears quite clearly when it is observed that these appropriate terms are names
of values of appropriate functions, namely concepts or relations (that is, functions of one or more arguments whose values are
truth-values).
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only three times in such a way as to openly designate a property of a statement of FGGBS20. In few other
cases—like in §§ I.12 and I.17—he openly claimed that a statement of FGGBS holds (gilt), while in most
cases he merely stated it by implying the same. In §§ 3 and 4 we shall adhere to this policy.
This way of forming statements within FGGBS has deep consequences on the internal structure of the
system, which we shall try to clarify in our reconstruction. One of them is that the identity sign ‘=’ is allowed
to occur both between two object-names other than truth-values (working as the terms of a modern formal
language) and between two names of a truth-value. In the former case, it plays the role of our identity-
predicate, in the latter, that of our connector of double implication ‘⇔’. This makes the isolation of the
propositional fragment of FGGBS non-trivial. In particular, the problem concerns the role of Basic Law IV,
which involves the sign ‘=’ between two names of a truth-value. In order to decide whether this law is part
of the propositional fragment of the FGGBS, it is not enough to look at it, as such; it is rather necessary
to consider whether such a propositional fragment does require this law in order to result in a complete
system of propositional logic. As a matter of fact, section § I. 51 of the Grundgesetze presents the derivation
of several propositional theorems from Basic Law IV. Among them are the principles of introduction and
cancellation of the double negation (that is, ‘p⇒ ¬¬p’ and ‘¬¬p⇒ p’, in modern notation), whose derivation
also has recourse, however, to Basic Laws IIb and III, which are openly second-order in nature. Insofar as
these principles were admitted as axioms in the system of the Begriffsschrift (where they are numbered as
statements 31 and 41, respectively), this could suggest, at first glance, not only that Basic Law I, (the only
one of Frege’s Basic Laws that is openly propositional in nature) is not enough, together with the deductive
rules that apply to it, in order to provide a complete propositional system, but also that this is no more the
case for Basic Laws I and IV taken together. This conclusion would be mistaken, however, since, as we shall
prove in § 3.5, Basic Law I is perfectly sufficient alone for this purpose. Frege’s appeal to other Basic Laws
of FGGBS in order to prove several propositional theorems is rather a symptom of his being unconcerned
with isolating a propositional fragment of FGGBS, as we have already observed in § 121.
20The first occurrence appears within the footnote appended to § I.114, where one finds this passage: “This statement [it is
not relevant here to say which it is, what is important is that it is a statement of FGGBS] is, it seems, unprovable, but it is
not asserted as true [als wahr behauptet ] here either, since it stands in quotation marks”([18], I.115, footnote (1); [22], p. 1141).
The second and third occurrences occurs within the Nachwort to volume II, where Frege presented his (unsuccessful) way-out to
Russell’s objection. There, he wrote that “the error [responsible for the paradox] can be only in [. . . ] Law (Vb) [the left-to-right
implication included in Basic Law V] which must therefore be false”, then, adds, some lines later, that “at least one of the two
statements (77) and (82) [two theorems proved in § I.91] is false, and hence also [statement] (1) [another consequence of Basic
Law V] from which they follow” ([18], Nachwort, p. 257; [22], p. 2572). While introducing the symbol ‘ ’, Frege said, instead,
that this symbol is needed “in order to be able to assert something as true [um etwas als wahr behaupten zu ko¨nnen]” ([18],
§ I.5; [22], p. 91).
21In the Foreword of the Grundgesetze ([18], Vorwort, pp. VI-VII; [22], pp. VI1-VII1) one finds this disclaimer:
One must strive to reduce the number of [. . . ] fundamental laws as far as possible by proving everything that is
provable. Furthermore, [. . . ] I demand that all modes of inference and consequence which are used be listed in
advance [. . . ]. This ideal I believe I have now essentially achieved. Only in a few points could one impose even
more rigorous demands. In order to attain more flexibility and to avoid excessive length, I have [. . . ] not reduced
the modes of inference and consequence to a minimum. Anyone acquainted with my little book Begriffsschrift will
gather from it how here too one could satisfy the strictest demands, but also that this would result in a considerable
increase in extent. Furthermore, I believe that the criticisms that can justifiably be made of this book will pertain
not to rigour but rather only to the choice of the course of proof and of the intermediate steps. Often several ways
of conducting a proof are available; I have not tried to pursue them all and it is possible, indeed likely, that I have
not always chosen the shortest. Let whoever has complaints on this score try to do better.
If this makes clear, on the one hand, that Frege was aware that his departure from the clear separation realised in the Begriff-
sschrift, between a propositional and a second-order system, was required by no intrinsic necessity, it also shows, on the other
hand, that he was not considering this separation as an important benefit to be conserved for reasons of conceptual clarity.
Moreover, nothing, either in this quotation or elsewhere in the Grundgesetze, shows that he was also aware that his Basic Law
I is enough, together with the deductive rules that apply to it, to provide a complete propositional system.
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Another thing that the previous account should make clear is that Frege’s conception of logic is univer-
salist. There was room, for him, neither for a plurality of logical systems, concerning different domains of
enquiry, nor for different or restricted domains of objects. As a consequence, the very idea that his system
of logic could have had different models, or even a particular model, was outside of his conceptions. He
attributed to the logical constants of FGGBS, as well as to any other component of it, a fixed meaning,
so conceived as to obtain appropriate definitions and prove theorems in their intended meaning. He was,
then, pursuing, so to say, an ideal of absolute completeness. Any requirement of relative completeness were
nonsensical for him.
This should not hide, however, that FGGBS was, for Frege, a formal proof system. Its language having
been fixed and a meaning having been attributed to all the components of this language, the Basic Laws of
FGGBS (i.e. its axioms) were certainly chosen—with the only notable exception of Basic Law V—among
the statements of this language that manifestly hold according to this meaning22, and its deductive rules
were certainly designed so as to preserve this property. Moreover, Frege justified both the latter and the
former by showing that they meet these conditions. Still, a proof within FGGBS is nothing but a chain
of statements following from the Basic Laws according to the deductive rules, which involves, as such, no
appeal to the meaning of the relevant symbols or formulas.
In this respect, the differences between FGGBS and a modern formal system are much more subtle than
those noted above. The main one depends on Frege’s endorsing the so-called context principle: “not to ask
for the meaning [Bedeutung ] of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a statement” ([15], p. X; [20],
p. XXII). Much has been written on this principle (cf. among others, [12], chapter 16-17; [34], § 4.2), and
there is certainly no room here for discussing it. It is only relevant to emphasise a particular consequence of
it (already mentioned above, en passant), namely the fact that, within FGGBS, non atomic object-names
are generated through function-names. As a consequence, within FGGBS, getting non-atomic object-names
requires passing through function-names, which, as we have said above, do not belong, as such, to the
language of FGGBS. Hence, this language has to import some incomplete symbols from another, previous
language, namely from Frege’s expository language, and complete them appropriately. Our proceeding by
steps in constructing the languages of our renderings of the propositional and second-order fragments of
FGGBS is also intended to account for this fact.
2.5 Roman, Greek, and Gothic Letters
The situation is even more complex because of another feature of FGGBS, which is independent, as such, of
the context principle. We have said above that Frege used upper-case Greek letters as indeterminate object-
names and others to form indeterminate function-names. This only happens in his expository language. In
the language of FGGBS, the place of these letters is taken by other letters, namely Roman ones (which,
according to Frege, indicate, but do not designate objects or functions: cf. p. 7, above). Above (at pp. 7
and 9) we have also said that in FGGBS statements are obtained by letting the symbol ‘ ’ precede either
a name of a truth-value, or an expression obtained by transforming such a name. Roman letters enter such
an expression, and are supposed to appear only within statements (since this expression is not allowed to
occur outside statements). They indicate that a statement in which they occur is universal, that is, it asserts
something that holds for all objects and/or all functions. For a simple example, consider the function ξ = ζ,
again. By replacing in its name ‘ξ’ with ‘Γ’ and ‘ζ’ with ‘∆’, one gets a term, namely ‘Γ = ∆’, which is
a name of the True if ‘Γ’ and ‘∆’ refer to the same object and a name of the False if ‘Γ’ and ‘∆’ refer to
22The exception of Basic Law V does not depend, of course, on the fact that Frege was not taking this Law to hold, but rather
on the fact that the meaning he attributed to the value-ranges function is just fixed by this Law ([18], §§ I.3, I.9, and I.20). This
function having been introduced, Frege fixed, then, the meaning of the definite-descriptions function by appealing to it, in such
a way that Basic Law VI promptly results from the way this meaning is fixed.
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two distinct objects. From this term, one can then get the statement ‘ Γ = ∆’, which asserts that the
truth-value named by ‘Γ = ∆’ is the True, that is, that Γ is the same object as ∆ (note that, by definition,
the function ξ = ζ is a dyadic relation, i.e. a two-arguments function whose values are truth-values; a name
of whatsoever value of this function is, then, a name of a truth-value). Again, by replacing in this statement
both ‘Γ’ and ‘∆’ with ‘a’, one gets the other statement ‘ a = a’, which asserts that the truth-value named
by any term obtained from ‘a = a’, by replacing ‘a’ with the name of any object is the True, that is, that
any object is identical with itself. By replacing, instead, ‘Γ’ with ‘a’ and ‘∆’ with ‘b’, one gets the statement
‘ a = b’, which asserts that the truth-value named by any term obtained from ‘a = b’ by respectively
replacing ‘a’ and ‘b’ with the names of any objects is the True, that is, that any object is identical both with
itself and with any other object. Whereas ‘ Γ = ∆’ is not a statement of FGGBS, the statements ‘ a = a’
and ‘ a = b’ are. Still, neither ‘a = a’ nor ‘a = b’ are FGGBS terms. The reason is that they are not
well-formed strings of symbols of its language, since, in FGGBS, Roman letters are only licensed to enter
statements. It is then possible that a component of a statement of FGGBS, though complete according to
the arity of the symbols that enter it, is not well-formed, which contrasts with what happens in a modern
formal system. But there is more. The fact that explaining the meaning to be assigned to Roman letters in
FGGBS requires appealing to statements and terms which do not involve such letters forces some deductive
rules of FGGBS (namely the propositional one) to be firstly stated for statements that do not involve these
letters (and, because of that, are not statements of FGGBS), and then extended to these last statements.
This is another contrast with what happens in a modern formal system.
A last point to be made, before coming to our reconstruction, concerns the absence of variables in
FGGBS, at least if these are conceived as is usual nowadays, that is, as components of a formal language
that can enter both bounded and open formulas with respect to them (in such a way that a bounded formula
with respect to a certain variable results from bounding this variable in an open one).
One might consider that the role that variables play in a modern formal language is played in FGGBS by
two sorts of letters, namely Roman letters for free variables, and Gothic letters for bound ones (we shall come
back to Frege’s use of Gothic letters in § 4). For Roman letters, this is, for example, Goldfarb’s view ([23],
p. 67). But, if this were so, it would also be clear that no single sort of letters (or symbols, in general) play
in this system the same role as that which variables play in a modern formal system. Since Roman letters
are neither FGGBS terms, nor are licensed to enter these terms23, though the language of FGGBS includes
functors, and, in FGGBS, the universal quantifier—the only one that occurs within its language—does not
act on these letters, but rather binds Gothic ones. This is more than a mere syntactical difference. As we
saw above, Roman letters express generality, for Frege. If they were taken to work as free variables, this
would mean that, for him, generality can be expressed through indeterminacy, which is certainly not the
idea of generality which is transmitted by a modern predicate language. The idea of generality transmitted
by such a language, namely by the way the universal quantifier works in it, is rather that of a specification
of indeterminacy by universalisation. This idea could also be detected at work in FGGBS, namely in the
way the universal quantifier works there. But this is not so insofar as this quantifier operates, there, on
Roman letters (which would allegedly play in this system the role of free variables) and binds them, but,
rather, insofar as it operates on Greek letters (either lower- or upper-case), and transform them into Gothic
23Semantically speaking, this could be understood as a consequence of Frege’s view that any term purportedly refers, that
is, designates an object: cf what we have said above (pp. 7, and 11 on Frege’s distinction between indicating and designating).
This is indeed what Frege openly claimed in the Foreword of the Grundgesetze ([18], Vorworth, p. XII; [22], p. XII1):
When one has reached the end, one should reread the entire exposition of Begriffsschrift [namely the first, expository
part of the Grundgesetze, i.e. the system FGGBS: cf. footnote 1, above] with this as background, keeping in mind
that those stipulations that will not be used later, and therefore appear unnecessary, serve to implement the
principle that all correctly formed signs ought to refer to something — a principle that is essential for full rigour.
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ones. Once discarded the idea that Roman letters work in FGGBS as open variables work in a modern
predicate language, this could suggest that what works this way are rather Greek letters. But this would
also be wrong, in fact, both for lower-case Greek letters and for upper-case ones. A first reason for this,
is that the former do not designate objects or functions, but merely hold places open for names of them,
whereas the latter behave as indeterminate names designating objects or functions, rather than as names
of indeterminate objects or functions (that is, as indeterminate individual or functional constants, rather
than as individual or functional variables, properly). Another reason, which is unquestionable, is that Greek
letters do not enter, as such, the language of FGGBS.
It then seems to us that all one can say on the matter of variables, concerning FGGBS, is that different
sorts of symbols entering its language, or connected with it (namely Roman, Gothic and Greek letters), play,
respectively, in this system, different roles that are somehow similar to the different roles that variables play
in a modern predicate system, though none of these symbols works in FGGBS as variables work in a modern
predicate system. This is perfectly compatible with Dummett’s claim that “nothing exactly corresponding
to a free variable appears in Frege’s symbolism” ([11], p. 16).
But there is more than this, in fact. Since it seems that Frege rejected the very notion of a variable as
a rightful notion, both in mathematics and in logic. This is suggested by what he wrote in a short paper
([19]) which appeared in 1904. He dealt there with analysis and arithmetic, but, clearly, the points he made
also apply to FGGBS, within which both analysis and arithmetic would have to be re-cast, according to
him. In short, these points are the following: “variation occurs within time” ([19], p. 656; [21], p. 107), and
neither analysis nor arithmetic have anything to do with time; though one can conceive something like a
particular (physical) magnitude, which is varying (in time), “a number does not vary”, since, for a variation
to be conceived, something that remains the same during the time of this variation is also to be conceived,
and nothing could remain the same if a number were to vary ([19], p. 658; [21], p. 109).
These are just the ideas which are reflected by Frege’s using lower-case Greek letters in function-names
as mere marks of unsaturation, rather than as names of variable objects or functions, as it usually happens,
and happened in Frege’s times, with ‘x’, ‘y’, or ‘z’. An immediate consequence of this is the impossibility
for Frege to account, and then admit, anything like a direct composition of functions. Consider the simplest
case of first-level functions. Let Φ (ξ) be such a function. By replacing ‘ξ’ in it with a function-name, say
‘Ψ (ξ)’, so as to get ‘Φ (Ψ (ξ))’, one would commit a syntactical mistake, since ‘ξ’ is there to hold a place open
for object-names, not for function-names. Moreover, by doing that, one would not transform ‘Φ (ξ)’ into an
object-name, as it is required, instead to any licensed replacement of ‘ξ’, since the function-name replacing
‘ξ’ cannot but be unsaturated, and this replacement would, then, transform an unsaturated expression into
another unsaturated expression. According to Frege’s conventions (which strictly reflected his views), there
is, thus, no way to pass from Φ (ξ) to Φ (Ψ (ξ)), by directly composing the function Φ (ξ) with the other
function Ψ (ξ). Something similar also holds for higher-level functions: by replacing a lower-case Greek
letter, occurring within a name of such a function to hold places open for function-names, with such an
appropriate name, one is intended to get, indeed, an object-name, namely a name of a value of this function,
not a name of another, composed function.
This does not prevent Frege from composing functions indirectly, by passing through their values and
then coming back to functions. In the case of our first-level functions Φ (ξ) and Ψ (ξ), one can, for example,
operate as follows. One first replaces ‘ξ’ in the name of the latter with an object-name, for example ‘Γ’, so as
to get another object-name, namely ‘Ψ (Γ)’. Then, one replaces ‘ξ’ in the name of the former function with
this last name, so as to get a new object-name, namely ‘Φ (Ψ (Γ))’. Finally, one replaces in this last name ‘Γ’
with ‘ξ’, again24, so as to get the name of a new function, namely ‘Φ (Ψ (ξ))’. With the only exception of the
24This is an example of analysis of an object-name: such a name being given, one analyses it by looking for the names of
functions one can get from it, by desaturating (cf. footnote 46, below) it in different ways (a practice perfectly in line with the
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basic functions, all other functions occurring within FGGBS, under the cloths of (the names of) their values,
are generated this way. We noted above that, within FGGBS, names of objects are generated from names of
functions. This should be enough to convince the reader that the reciprocal is also true: names of functions
are, in turn, generated from names of objects. The interweave between these two sorts of names—the latter
of which, are not part, as such, of the language of FGGBS, as we have said—is pervasive in such a system.
All of this having been said, it is time to come to our reconstruction. In § 3, we present a formal system,
which is intended to render the propositional fragment of FGGBS. Later, in § 4, we extend this system so as
to render the predicate fragment of FGGBS. We call the former system ‘FGGPLR’, for ‘Frege Grundgesetze
Propositional Logic Reconstructed’, and the latter ‘FGGL2R’ for ‘Frege Grundgesetze Second-Order Logic
Reconstructed’.
3 Frege’s Propositional System Reconstructed
3.1 Basic Functions
Let the lower-case Greek letters ‘ξ’ and ‘ζ’ be used to hold a place open for whatsoever object-name in any
expression within which they occur, such an expression being intended as a function-name. This means that
such an expression is allowed to be transformed in a name of a value of the relevant function—which is an
object-name, in turn—by replacing each occurrence of each of these letters by the same object-name. Let
also ‘T’ and ‘F’ respectively refer to the True and the False, and the upper-case Greek letters ‘Γ’, ‘∆’, and
‘Θ’ be indeterminate object-names. This being supposed, let us admit that the truth conditions are known
of any statement of the natural language having one of the following two forms:
— ‘Γ is T/F if ∆ is (not) T/F, and it is F/T if ∆ is (not) F/T’,
— ‘Γ is T/F if ∆ is (not) T/F and Θ is (not) T/F,
and it is F/T if it is not the case that ∆ is (not) T/F and Θ is (not) T/F’,
where ‘is (not)’ stands either for ‘is’ or for ‘is not’, and ‘T/F’ and ‘F/T’ stand either for ‘T’ or for ‘F’,
alternatively. Finally, let us take
‘Γ is
{
T/F if . . .
F/T if . . .
’
to stand for
‘Γ is T/F if . . . , and it is F/T if . . . ’ .
By also supposing that ‘O’ denotes the totality of objects, including T and F, we can then define three
first-level functions as follows:
— Let ξ : O→ {T,F} be such that Γ is
{
T if Γ is T
F if Γ is not T
;
— Let ¬ξ : O→ {T,F} be such that ¬Γ is
{
F if Γ is T
T if Γ is not T
;
— Let ζ ⇒ ξ : O2 → {T,F} be such that ∆⇒ Γ is

F if ∆ is T and Γ is not T
T
if it is not the case that




Here ‘: O → {T,F}’ is used to mean that the relevant functions take an object and give either T or F,
while ‘: O2 → {T,F}’ is used to mean that the relevant function takes two objects (an object as ζ-argument,
and another as ξ-argument) and gives either T or F, again25.
The function ξ renders the first of Frege’s basic functions, namely —ξ, introduced in § I.5. It is easy
to see that the value Γ of the function ξ, for Γ as an argument is the same object as Γ, whatever object
Γ might be. Hence the (indirect) composition of this function with itself results in itself. This justifies the
rule that Frege called ‘fusion of horizontals [Verschmelzung der Wagerechten]’ ([18], §§ 6, 12; [22], pp. 101,
201), according to which any number of horizontal strokes like ‘—’, or horizontals tout-court, in Frege’s
parlance ([18], § 5; [22], p. 91), fuse to each other, that is, count as only one horizontal. This allowed Frege
to take the signs ‘ ’ and ‘ ’, occurring within the names of his functions ξ and ξ
ζ
(which are
those that we render as ¬ξ and ζ ⇒ ξ) as “composed [zusammengesetzt ]” by horizontals, together with two
distinct sorts of vertical signs, namely the “negation-stroke [Verneinungstrich ]” and the “conditional-stroke
[Bedingungstrich]” ([18], § I.6, I.12; [22], pp. 101, 201)26.
This could suggest taking the functions ¬ξ and ζ ⇒ ξ as resulting, by (indirect) composition, from the
function ξ and two other elementary functions, which could be defined by letting
— ¬ξ : {T,F} → {T,F} to be such that ¬Γ is
{
F if Γ is T
T if Γ is F
;
— ζ ⇒ ξ : {T,F}2 → {T,F} to be such that ∆⇒ Γ is

F if ∆ is T and Γ is F
T
if it is not the case that
∆ is T and Γ is F
.
It is still a fact that neither in the Grundgesetze, nor in any other of Frege’s works, there is any trace of
functions that one could render this way, as well as of any other first-level function not defined on the totality
of objects. Hence, to stay close to Frege’s own exposition, one cannot but consider the functions ¬ξ and
ζ ⇒ ξ as genuine basic (and, then, elementary, i.e. non-composed) functions of FGGPLR, and take fusion
of horizontals as a consequence of the definition of the function ξ, which merely allows using the sign ‘−−’
within the names of functions ¬ξ and ζ ⇒ ξ, without any inconvenience.
It remains, however, that the mere use of this symbol within these names is enough to suggest that each
of the functions ¬ξ and ζ ⇒ ξ admits two characterisations: a direct one, depending on their definition,
in terms of their own arguments; and a truth-functional one, depending on the occurrence of the sign ‘−−’
within their names, in terms of the values of the function ξ. According to the latter,
— ¬ξ : O→ {T,F} is such that ¬Γ is
{
F if Γ is T
T if Γ is F
;
— ζ ⇒ ξ : O2 → {T,F} is such that ∆⇒ Γ is

F if ∆ is T and Γ is F
T
if it is not the case that
∆ is T and Γ is F
.
This is what allows the functions ¬ξ and ζ ⇒ ξ to play, within FGGPLR, the same role as that which the
connectives of negation and implication play in a modern propositional system, though they are not, properly,
25Note the difference between the meaning that is here ascribed to these symbols and the one that they usually take in a
contemporary set-theoretic setting (provided that speaking of objects in general makes sense in this setting). Note in particular
that, here ‘O2’ is not used to denote a domain of pairs (that is, the totality of pairs of objects), but merely to indicate that the
relevant function has two arguments. In Frege’s spirit, a two-arguments function, is, indeed, a function on the same domain (or
totality), as a one-argument function of the same level, and not a function on pairs of elements of this domain.
26Frege took this to be the case also of the symbol ‘ ’, used to form statements, whose vertical stroke is called ‘judgement-
stroke [Urtheilstrich]’ by him ([18], § I.5; [22], p. 91).
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connectives, that is, operators acting on sentences, but functions defined on the totality of objects27.
As a matter of fact, operatively speaking, Frege could have avoided introducing the function —ξ by
directly defining his two functions ξ and ξ
ζ
just as he did (i.e. in the way we have rendered by
our definition of functions ¬ξ and ζ ⇒ ξ), but mentioning neither the former function, nor the horizontal
and the negation- and conditional-strokes, that is, by taking the signs ‘ ’ and ‘ ’ as un-composed28.
Operatively speaking, the role of the function —ξ in FGGBS is, indeed, only that of transforming any
object in a truth-value, and this same role could, in fact, also be played by the functions ξ, ξ
ζ
, as
well as by the first- and second-order-quantifier functions (cf. footnote 28, above), also if no appeal to the
horizontal stroke (and then, implicitly, to the function —ξ) were done in their explanation. Still, apart from
resulting in a loss of perspicuity, this would have prevented Frege from using the identity function, both as
a propositional connective (which occurs when this functions applies to two values of the functions —ξ) and
as a relation between two objects whatsoever (cf. p. 10, above, and § 3.6, below). No doubt, Frege could also









(which is rendered by ¬ζ ⇒ ξ ⇒ ¬ξ ⇒ ζ, in our notation:
cf. footnote 27, above). But it is a fact that Frege did not follow this road, which would have, by the way,
seriously complicated his formalism and strongly modified the nature of his system. This is why we follow
Frege in giving a place to the function ξ within FGGPLR. This allows us to give a precise characterisation
of the atomic terms of this system.
3.2 Terms and Particular Statements
Defining the functions ξ, ¬ξ and ζ ⇒ ξ has required to appeal to the natural language endowed with some
appropriate symbols used for brevity. This having been done, we are now ready to fix the language of
FGGPLR. We shall do it by steps.
To begin, let LAT[FGGPLR] be the language {Γ,∆,Θ,Λ,Ξ,Π,Σ, . . . ,−− }, in which ‘Γ’, ‘∆’, ‘Θ’, ‘Λ’, ‘Ξ’, ‘Π’,
‘Σ’, . . . have arity 0 and are called ‘FGGPLR object-letters’, while ‘−−’ has arity 1, and behaves in agreement
with the definitions of the function ξ. Here the ellipses are intended to remain for the same letters ‘Γ’, ‘∆’,
‘Θ’, ‘Λ’, ‘Ξ’, ‘Π’, ‘Σ’ endowed with appropriate indexes, so as to form a potentially infinite collection of
symbols, all having arity 0. This simple language is used to form FGGPLR atomic terms, according to the
following stipulations:
27On the base of these two functions, one could, of course, explicitly define, by indirect composition, two other functions,
working as the connectives of conjunction and disjunction. As a matter of fact, Frege observed that the functions ξ
ζ
and
BGconditional ζξ respectively render the ‘and’ and the ‘or’ of the natural language ([18], § I.12; [22], p. 211), but introduced
no special symbol to shorten the names of these functions. We follow his policy and introduce no special sign for the conjunction
and the disjunction, which are rather rendered in FGGPLR by the functions ¬ζ ⇒ ¬ξ and ¬ζ ⇒ ξ.
28If he had followed this route, he should, of course, have done the same, mutatis mutandis, also for ‘ ’ (cf. footnote 26,
above) and for the first- and second-order-quantifier functions.
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St AT[FGGPLR].i If θ is a FGGPLR object-letter, then θ
29 is a FGGPLR atomic term.
St AT[FGGPLR].ii If θ is a FGGPLR atomic term, then also θ is a FGGPLR atomic term.
St AT[FGGPLR].iii Nothing else is a FGGPLR atomic term.
Now let LT[FGGPLR] be the language LAT[FGGPLR]∪{¬−−,−−⇒−−}, resulting from the addition, to LAT[FGGPLR],
of the two new symbols ‘¬−−’, with arity 1, and ‘−− ⇒−−’, with 2, which behave in agreement with the
definitions of the function ¬ξ and ζ ⇒ ξ. This language is used to form FGGPLR terms, according to the
following stipulations:
St T[FGGPLR].i If θ and τ are FGGPLR object-letters, atomic terms, or terms, then θ, ¬θ and θ ⇒ τ are
FGGPLR terms;
St T[FGGPLR].ii Nothing else is a FGGPLR term.
It follows, of course, that FGGPLR atomic term are FGGPLR terms.
FGGPLR object-letters are intended to refer to unspecified objects of any sort, which means that we
suppose that there are objects, even if unspecified ones, which these letters name ([18], § I.5, footnote 3).
In agreement with the definition of the functions ξ, ¬ξ and ζ ⇒ ξ, FGGPLR terms are rather intended to
refer either to T or to F, which are the only objects that FGGPLR is intended to deal with, specifically.
This explains why the previous stipulations are so shaped that replacing FGGPLR terms with FGGPLR
object-letters, within a FGGPLR term, might result in getting something that is no longer a FGGPLR term.
To take a simple example, start with the FGGPLR term ‘Γ⇒ ∆’, and replace in it ‘Γ’ with ‘Γ’. This results
in ‘Γ ⇒ ∆’, which is not a FGGPLR term. Replacing FGGPLR object-letters with FGGPLR terms within
a FGGPLR term, always results, instead, in another FGGPLR term. This agrees with the rule of fusion of
horizontals, intended as a rule for formation of terms (cf. footnote 36, below), or better as the reciprocal of
such a rule. This rule is, thus, implicit in the previous stipulations, and this allows the symbol ‘−−’ to play
the role of parentheses in FGGPLR. This use of this symbol parallels Frege’s use of his horizontal stroke, but
is a little bit larger, since, as it will become clear in § 3.6, it also allows avoiding using parentheses to delimit
the scope of the identity sign when it applies to values of the function ξ —like in the statement of Basic Law
IV, for example—, whereas Frege is forced to use them for this purpose. Finally, replacing FGGPLR terms
with other FGGPLR terms within a FGGPLR term always results, again, in another FGGPLR term.
If within a FGGPLR term, a FGGPLR object-letter is replaced with another such letter or with a
FGGPLR term, the new term which is obtained this way remains with the initial one in a special relation,
which is fixed by the following stipulation:
StIs.T[FGGPLR] If θ is a FGGPLR object-letter, ϑ a FGGPLR object-letter or a FGGPLR term, %[θ] and %[ϑ/θ]
two FGGPLR terms such that θ occurs within %[θ], and %[ϑ/θ] results from %[θ] by replacing in it all
the occurrences of θ with ϑ, then %[ϑ/θ] is an instance of %[θ]. 30
29For the sake of simplicity, in the present § 3, we take the liberty of using some meta-variables intended to range over
FGGPLR object-letters, terms, or object-markers, in order to form expressions involving, together with these meta-variables,
some symbols of the languages LAT[FGGPLR], LT[FGGPLR] and LGS[FGGPLR] used to form these same object-letters, terms or object-
markers (cf. below for the definition of the languages LT[FGGPLR] and LGS[FGGPLR] and of FGGPLR object-markers). In this case,
we assume that these last symbols refer to themselves as symbols of the object-language, and avoid any use of quotation marks.
30Insofar as nothing forbids in this stipulation that ϑ be the same object-letter as θ, it follows that, according to it, any
FGGPLR particular statement is an instance of itself.
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This stipulation relies on the notion of occurrence of a FGGPLR object-letter within a FGGPLR term.
The general notion of occurrence of a string of symbols within another string of symbols will play a crucial
role in all what follows, with respect both to FGGPLR and to FGGL2R. As this notion is common in modern
logic, one might believe that it requires no explanation. However, among the differences between FGGPLR
and FGGL2R, on the one side, and a modern system of logic, on the other, there is one that makes the
understanding of this notion in the former systems slightly different than in the latter. Though this does
not happen for the simple case of the occurrence of a FGGPLR object-letter within a FGGPLR term, it is
worth giving as of now a short explanation of the way it has to be understood in FGGPLR and FGGL2R.
The problem depends on the role plaid in these systems by the function ξ. As we have said above (cf.
p. 15), this function is intended to render Frege’s function —ξ. There is, however, among others, a crucial
difference between these two functions, or better between the way the horizontal stroke ‘—’ works in FGGBS
and the way the upper bar ‘−−’ works both in FGGPLR and in FGGL2R. Whereas any occurrence on the
upper bar ‘−−’ is perfectly distinguishable as such, so as to allow one to precisely count these occurrences
in any relevant expression (so to say, for example, that ‘Γ’ differs from ‘Γ’ and ‘Γ’ from ‘Γ’, since the first
involves one occurrence of ‘−−’, the second two such occurrences, and the third three), Frege’s rule of “fusion
of horizontals”, makes a single occurrence of the stroke ‘—’ indistinguishable from as many such occurrences
as one wants. For example, in the single expression ‘ ∆
Γ
’, one can find arbitrarily many occurrences of
this stroke both before the vertical stoke and after it, both above and below. It follows that this expression
can be rendered, in our notation, in an infinity of different ways, for example, by ‘Γ⇒ ∆’, ‘Γ⇒ ∆’, ‘Γ⇒ ∆’
Γ⇒ ∆, ‘Γ⇒ ∆’, ‘Γ⇒ ∆’, ‘Γ⇒ ∆’ ‘Γ⇒ ∆’, etc.31. Hence, whereas both in FGGPLR and to FGGL2R, the
passage from θ to θ (where θ is any term or object-letter) depends on the application of an appropriate rule,
in FGGBS no such rule is needed, since no passage analogous to this is detectable. This difference is a price
we have to pay, in order to transform Frege’s multi-level notation in a mono-level notation.
When this is coupled with our making, in accordance with Frege’s habit, the symbol ‘−−’ play the role of
parentheses, then the notion of occurrence of a string of symbols within another string of symbols becomes,
with respect to our notation, much less immediately and simply understandable than it is with respect both
to Frege’s notation and to that currently used in modern systems of logic.
Precisely fixing the notion of occurrence of a string of symbols within another string of symbols with
respect to our notation would require a tiresome development. Instead we give an informal explanation
limited to the problematic cases we shall run into. Concerning FGGPLR, these cases only pertain to the
(values of the) functions ¬ξ and ζ ⇒ ζ (we shall come back in § 4.3 to other problematical cases concerning
FGGL2R): if θ and τ are two FGGPLR terms32, then, whereas θ and τ occur within θ ⇒ τ , and θ occurs
within ¬θ, neither θ nor τ occur within θ ⇒ τ , and θ does not occur within ¬θ.
This being said, let us return to our formal presentation, and further extend our formal language, by
adding the symbol ‘ ’ to LT[FGGPLR], so as to get the language LPS[FGGPLR] = LT[FGGPLR]∪
{ }
. This language
is used to form FGGPLR particular statements. This hinges on the following stipulations:
St PS[FGGPLR].i If θ is a FGGPLR term, then θ is a FGGPLR particular statement.
St PS[FGGPLR].ii Nothing else is a FGGPLR particular statement.
31Note that, in our notation, the occurrence of the horizontal stroke before the vertical one, in ‘ ’, can be disregarded.
32Note, also, that requiring that θ and τ be FGGPLR terms entails requiring that these terms present at least one occurrence
of the symbol ‘−−’ such that no part of such a term falls outside its scope. So, whereas θ and τ can, for example, stand for ‘Γ’,
‘¬Γ’ and ‘Γ⇒ ∆’, they cannot stand for ‘¬Γ’ and ‘Γ⇒ ∆’.
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If θ is a FGGPLR particular statement, let us say that θ is its FGGPLR term. Let us then say that:
St As.PS[FGGPLR] A FGGPLR particular statement asserts that the truth-value named by its FGGPLR term is
T;
St Hld.PS[FGGPLR] A FGGPLR particular statement holds if its FGGPLR term is a name of T; and it does not
hold if its FGGPLR term is a name of F.
Stipulation StIs.T[FGGPLR] naturally suggests the following one for FGGPLR particular statements:
St Is.PS[FGGPLR] A FGGPLR particular statement is an instance of a FGGPLR particular statement if and only
if the FGGPLR term of the former is an instance of the FGGPLR term of the latter33.
FGGPLR particular statements can, moreover, follow from each other. This depends on an inductive
stipulation, whose base is given by the next eight rules, where, supposing that θ, ϑ, τ are FGGPLR








’ as graphical shorthand for ‘ τ immediately
follows from θ’ and ‘ τ immediately follows from θ and ϑ’, respectively:





This is a substitution rule within FGGPLR particular statements, and renders Frege’s tacit replacement
rules for upper-case Greek letters34.
Rl PS[FGGPLR].ii If θ, %[θ], and %[θ/.θ], %
′[θ], and %′[θ/.θ] are five FGGPLR terms, such that θ occurs within
%[θ] either once or several times, θ occurs within %′[θ] either once or several times, %[θ/.θ] results from
%[θ] by replacing one or more of the occurrences of θ with θ, and %′[θ/.θ] results from %′[θ] by replacing









33Note, again, that, according to this stipulation, and to stipulation StIs.T[FGGPLR], any FGGPLR particular statement is an
instance of itself: cf. footnote 30, above.
34Frege makes his replacement rules explicit only with respect to Roman letters ([18], § I.48.9). He clearly applies, however,
analogous rules also to upper-case Greek letters.
35The dot placed after ‘/’, both in ‘%[θ/.θ]’ and in ‘%′[θ/.θ]’ is intended to signal that the replacement is not to be done for
all the occurrences on the relevant term, but for some of its occurrences (possibly for only one of them, possibly for several,
possibly for all). Note also that here, as well as in all the following rules, it applies the same notational convention spelt out
in footnote 32. So, whereas θ can stand, for example, for ‘Γ’, ‘¬Γ’ and ‘Γ⇒ ∆’, it cannot stand for ‘¬Γ’ and ‘Γ⇒ ∆’. Hence,
whereas this rule implies, for example, that from ‘Λ ⇒ Θ’, it follows ‘Λ ⇒ Θ’, from ‘Γ⇒ ∆ ⇒ Θ’, follows ‘Γ⇒ ∆ ⇒ Θ’, and
from ‘¬Γ ⇒ ∆’ follows ‘¬Γ ⇒ ∆’, it implies neither that from ‘Γ⇒ ∆ ⇒ Θ’, follows ‘Γ ⇒ ∆ ⇒ Θ’, nor that from ‘¬Γ ⇒ ∆’
follows‘¬Γ ⇒ ∆’, and, indeed, neither ‘Γ ⇒ ∆ ⇒ Θ’, nor ‘¬Γ ⇒ ∆’ are FGGPLR terms. It follows that θ is nothing but what
stands under the symbol ‘−−’ in θ.
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This renders Frege’s rule of fusion of horizontals, intended as a deductive rule ([18], § I.48.1; [22],
pp. 611)36.
Rl PS[FGGPLR].iii If κi,1, κi,2, . . . , κi,ni (where i = 1, 2, 3 and ni is an arbitrary natural number), θ1, θ2, τ are
FGGPLR terms, ‘−→κi ⇒’ (i = 1, 2) stand for ‘κi,1 ⇒ κi,2 ⇒ . . .
...
⇒ κi,ni ⇒ ’ (i.e. for nothing if ni = 0,
for ‘κi,1 ⇒ ’ if ni = 1, for ‘κi,1 ⇒ κi,2 ⇒ ’ if ni = 2, &c., where the symbol ‘’ is intended to
mean that the upper strokes over it extend to the right over the following ones, up to the end of the
statement), and ‘⇒ −→κ3’ stands for ‘⇒ κ3,1 ⇒ κ3,2 ⇒
...
. . .⇒ κ3,n3’, then:
−→κ1 ⇒ θ1 ⇒ −→κ2 ⇒ θ2 ⇒ −→κ3 ⇒ τ
———————————————−→κ1 ⇒ θ2 ⇒ −→κ2 ⇒ θ1 ⇒ −→κ3 ⇒ τ
.
This is a rule of transformation of FGGPLR particular statements, and renders Frege’s rule of “per-
mutation of subcomponents” ([18], §§ I.12 and I.48.2; [22], pp. 221 and 611)37.
Rl PS[FGGPLR].iv If κi,1, κi,2, . . . , κi,ni (where i = 1, 2 and ni is an arbitrary natural number), θ1, θ2 are
FGGPLR terms, ‘−→κ1 ⇒’ and ‘⇒ −→κ2’ respectively behave like ‘−→κ1 ⇒’ and ‘⇒ −→κ3’ in rule RlPS[FGGPLR]. iii,
and each of ‘θi ’, ‘θ

i ’ (i = 1, 2) stands either for ‘θi’ or for ‘¬θi’, provided that ‘θi ’ stands for ‘¬θi’ if
‘θi ’ stands for ‘θi’, and for ‘θi’ if ‘θ

i ’ stands for ‘¬θi’, then:
−→κ1 ⇒ θ1 ⇒ −→κ2 ⇒ θ2
————————————−→κ1 ⇒ θ2 ⇒ −→κ2 ⇒ θ1
.
This is another rule of transformation of FGGPLR particular statements, and renders Frege’s rule of
“contraposition” ([18], §§ I.15 and I.48.3; [22], pp. 271 and 611).
Rl PS[FGGPLR].v If κi,1, κi,2, . . . , κi,ni (where i = 1, 2, 3 and ni is an arbitrary natural number), θ, τ are
FGGPLR terms, ‘−→κi ⇒’ (i = 1, 2) and ‘⇒ −→κ3’ behave as in rule RlPS[FGGPLR].iii, while ‘
−→κ3 ⇒’ behaves
like ‘−→κ1 ⇒’ in this same rule, then:
−→κ1 ⇒ θ ⇒ −→κ2 ⇒ θ ⇒ −→κ3 ⇒ τ
———————————————−→κ1 ⇒ θ ⇒ −→κ2 ⇒ −→κ3 ⇒ τ
.
This is a new rule of transformation of FGGPLR particular statements, and renders Frege’s rule of
“fusion of equal subcomponents” ([18], §§ I.15 and I.48.4; [22], pp. 291 and 611).
36The rule of fusion of horizontals is embodied in Frege’s notation, with the result of blurring the twofold role it plays in
FGGBS, as a rule for the formation of terms and as a deductive rule. This rule is however both appealed to during the explanation
of the function-names ‘—ξ’, ‘ ξ’ and ‘ ξ
ζ
’ ([18], §§ 6, 12), and listed among the deductive rules ([18], § I.48.1).
37In stating this rule, we could have omitted both ‘−→κ2 ⇒’ and ‘⇒ −→κ3’, without any relevant consequence for its deductive
strength. Some of the inferences that the rule, as we state it, licences in only one step, would be, indeed, also licensed by the
rule so simplified in several reiterated steps. We state the rule as we do only for sake of perspicuity. Mutatis mutandis, the same
also holds for the rules RlPS[FGGPLR]. iv-viii
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Rl PS[FGGPLR].vi If κi,1, κi,2, . . . , κi,ni (where i = 1, 2 and ni is an arbitrary natural number), θ, τ are
FGGPLR terms, ‘−→κ1 ⇒’ and ‘⇒ −→κ2’ respectively behave like ‘−→κ1 ⇒’ and ‘⇒ −→κ3’ in rule RlPS[FGGPLR]. iii,
while ‘−→κ2 ⇒’ behaves like ‘−→κ1 ⇒’ in this same rule, then:
θ ; −→κ1 ⇒ θ ⇒ −→κ2 ⇒ τ
—————————————−→κ1 ⇒ −→κ2 ⇒ τ
.
This is a generalisation of modus ponens, and renders Frege’s “first mode of inference” ([18], In-
haltsverzeichniss of vol. I, p. XXVII, and §§ I.14 and I.48.6; [22], pp. XXVII1, 25-261 and 621).
Rl PS[FGGPLR].vii If κi,1, κi,2, . . . , κi,ni (where i = 1, 2, 3, 4 and ni is an arbitrary natural number), θ, τ , ϑ are
FGGPLR terms, ‘−→κ1 ⇒’, ‘−→κ3 ⇒’, ‘−→κ2 ⇒’, and ‘−→κ4 ⇒’ behave like ‘−→κ1 ⇒’ in rule RlPS[FGGPLR]. iii, while
‘⇒ −→κ2’ and ‘⇒ −→κ4’ behave like ‘⇒ −→κ3’ in this same rule, then:
−→κ1 ⇒ θ ⇒ −→κ2 ⇒ τ ; −→κ3 ⇒ τ ⇒ −→κ4 ⇒ ϑ
————————————————————−→κ1 ⇒ θ ⇒ −→κ2 ⇒ −→κ3 ⇒ −→κ4 ⇒ ϑ
.
This is another generalisation of modus ponens, and renders Frege’s “second mode of inference” ([18],
Inhaltsverzeichniss of vol. I, p. XXVII, and §§ I.15 and I.48.7; [22], pp. XXVII1, 26-271 and 621).
RlPS[FGGPLR]. viii If κi,1, κi,2, . . . , κi,ni (where i = 1, 2, 3, 4 and ni is an arbitrary natural number), θ, τ are
FGGPLR terms, ‘−→κ1 ⇒’, ‘−→κ3 ⇒’, ‘−→κ2 ⇒’, and ‘−→κ4 ⇒’ behave like ‘−→κ1 ⇒’ in rule RlPS[FGGPLR].iii, while
‘⇒ −→κ2’ and ‘⇒ −→κ4’ behave like ‘⇒ −→κ3’ in this same rule, then:
−→κ1 ⇒ ¬θ ⇒ −→κ2 ⇒ τ ; −→κ3 ⇒ θ ⇒ −→κ4 ⇒ τ
—————————————————————−→κ1 ⇒ −→κ2 ⇒ −→κ3 ⇒ −→κ4 ⇒ τ
.
This renders Frege’s “third mode of inference” ([18], Inhaltsverzeichniss of vol. I, p. XXVII, and §§ I.16
and I.48.8; [22], pp. XXVII1, 30-311 and 621). In fact, it is a consequence of rules RlPS[FGGPLR].ii-v, vii,
as showed by Frege himself38. For the sake of the simplicity of his further deductions, he nevertheless
considered appropriate to state it as an independent rule.
It is easy to see that all these rules are sound: they are such that their outputs hold if their inputs do.
This is what justifies these rules39, and makes them a suitable basis for the inductive stipulation fixing the
relation of following from, as defined on FGGPLR particular statements:
St Flw.PS[FGGPLR].i If θ, ϑ and τ are FGGPLR particular statements, τ respectively follows from θ, or
from θ and ϑ, if it immediately follows from them (according to the rules RlPS[FGGPLR]. i.viii).
St Flw.PS[FGGPLR].ii If τ , θi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n), ϑi (i = 1, 2, . . . ,m) are FGGPLR particular statements, τ
follows from θ1, θ2, . . . , θn, and θ1 follows from ϑ1, . . . , ϑm, then τ follows from ϑ1, . . . ,
ϑm, θ2, . . . , θn.
St Flw.PS[FGGPLR]. iii No FGGPLR particular statement follows from any number of other FGGPLR particular




38In Frege’s deductions, the appeal to rules RlPS[FGGPLR]. iii,v is not made explicit, while rule Rl
PS
[FGGPLR]
. ii is embodied in
his notation: cf. footnote 36.
39As it is made clear by the passage quoted in footnote 21, Frege was perfectly aware that he could have reduced the number
of his deductive rules. It seems that he felt licensed to multiply them, in the interest of the simplicity of his deductions (without
running any risk of error), just insofar as their soundness is manifest.
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3.3 General Statements or Well-Formed Formulas
3.3.1 Preliminary Explanations
We can now move on to FGGPLR general statements. These are just the same as FGGPLR particular
statements, except for the fact that they include lower-case Roman letters instead of Greek upper-case ones.
According to our foregoing stipulation, the latter letters, namely FGGPLR object-letters, are object-names
referring to unspecified objects. The former letters are intended to merely indicate objects (cf. p. 7 and §
2.5, above). Their use is submitted to the stipulation that a FGGPLR general statement asserts that the
truth-value named by the FGGPLR term of a FGGPLR particular statement obtained from such a FGGPLR
general statement, by replacing any occurrence of each such letter with an occurrence of the same FGGPLR
object-letter whatsoever, is T, irrespectively of the objects that the relevant object-letters refer to (which
entails that the truth-value named by any instance of such a term is also T). This is the same as stipulating
that a FGGPLR general statement asserts that a FGGPLR particular statement obtained from it in this
way holds irrespectively of the objects that the object-letters occurring within it refer to (which entails that
this is also the case for any instance of this particular statement). If this happens, it is, then, natural to
say that such a FGGPLR general statement holds, in turn, and that it does not hold, if this is not what
happens, which renders bivalence with respect to FGGPLR general statements. Take two simple examples:
the FGGPLR general statements ‘ a⇒ b’ and ‘ a⇒ b⇒ a’ respectively assert that the FGGPLR particular
statements ‘ ∆⇒ Γ’ and ‘ ∆⇒ Γ⇒ ∆’ hold irrespectively of the objects that ‘∆’ and ‘Γ’ refer to; hence,
the latter of these FGGPLR general statements holds, whereas the former does not.
The crucial difference between FGGPLR particular and general statements that results from these stip-
ulations becomes clear by observing that what a FGGPLR object-letter is intended to name is a particular
object, though an unspecified one. Hence a FGGPLR particular statement is intended to assert something
about a finite number of particular, though unspecified, objects, not about an arbitrary system of arbitrarily
many objects. A FGGPLR general statement is, instead, just intended to assert that any system of an
appropriate number of objects satisfies a certain condition. For example, whereas the FGGPLR particular
statement ‘ ∆⇒ Γ’ asserts of the unspecified objects ∆ and Γ that it is not the case that the former is T
and the latter is not T—which might certainly happen, if these objects are suitably specified—, the FGGPLR
general statement ‘ a⇒ b’ asserts that the FGGPLR particular statement ‘ ∆⇒ Γ’ holds irrespectively of
the objects that ‘∆’ and ‘Γ’ refer to, i.e. that, whatever these objects might be, it is not the case that the
former is T and the latter is not T—which certainly does not happen.
Insofar as this stipulation is the only one we make about the meaning to be ascribed to lower-case Roman
letters within FGGPLR, it follows that these letters are only licensed to enter FGGPLR statements, namely
general such statements, but not FGGPLR terms, or any other sort of well-formed strings of symbols that
one might form within FGGPLR. This makes any FGGPLR term a particular term: a term referring to a
particular object, though unspecified, which agrees with Frege’s views expounded in § 2.5 while speaking of
free variables (cf., in particular, the passage quoted in footnote 23).
These views are in line with Frege’s admission of no propositional particular statement within FGGBS,
that is, with the idea that propositional particular statements have their place only within the expository
language of this system, whereas the system itself only includes general such statements. Hence, properly
speaking, FGGPLR particular statements render no well-formed formula of FGGBS, and it is, then, natural
to take FGGPLR general statements to be the only well-formed formulas of FGGPLR, while considering
FGGPLR particular statements as auxiliary statements, and LPS[FGGPLR], as well as LT[FGGPLR] and LAT[FGGPLR],
as auxiliary preliminary languages.
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3.3.2 Formal Treatment
All this being said in the guise of preliminary explanations, let us consider the matter formally.
Let LGS[FGGPLR] be the language
{
a, b, c, d, . . . , −−, ¬−−,−−⇒−−,
}
obtained from LPS[FGGPLR] by replac-
ing its object-letters with the Roman letters ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’, ‘d’, . . . , called ‘FGGPLR general letters for objects’,
also with arity 0. Here the ellipses are intended to stay for the same letters ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c ’, ‘d’ endowed with ap-
propriate indexes, so as to form a potentially infinite collection of symbols, all having arity 0. This language
is used to form FGGPLR general statements (which explains our using the acronym ‘GS’ in ‘LGS[FGGPLR]’),
according to the following stipulations:
St GS[FGGPLR].i If θ is a FGGPLR particular statement and |θ| results from it by replacing each distinct
FGGPLR object-letter in it with a distinct FGGPLR general letter for objects (so that any occurrence
of the same FGGPLR object-letter is replaced by an occurrence of the same FGGPLR general letter
for objects), then the latter is a FGGPLR general statement.
St GS[FGGPLR].ii Nothing else is a FGGPLR general statement.
StWFF[FGGPLR] FGGPLR general statements are the only well-formed formulas of FGGPLR.
If a FGGPLR general statement results from a FGGPLR particular one as |θ| is said to result from θ in
stipulation StGS[FGGPLR].i —so that the latter results from the former according to the inverse replacements—
, then the former is said to correspond to the latter and vice versa. For example, ‘ a ⇒ b’ is said to
correspond to ‘ Γ⇒ ∆’, and vice versa. If each of several FGGPLR general statements corresponds to one
of as many FGGPLR particular statements, according to the same replacements of FGGPLR object-letters
with FGGPLR general letters for objects, the former statements are said to uniformly correspond to the
latter ones, and vice versa. For example, ‘ a ⇒ b’ and ‘ a ⇒ b⇒ a’ are said to uniformly correspond to
‘ Γ⇒ ∆’ and ‘ Γ⇒ ∆⇒ Γ’, and vice versa.
Let us also stipulate that40:
StAs.GS[FGGPLR] A FGGPLR general statement asserts that a FGGPL R particular statement which corresponds
to it holds whatsoever objects might be named by the FGGPLR object-letters occurring within it;
StHld.GS[FGGPLR] A FGGPLR general statement holds if and only if a FGGPLR particular statement which cor-
responds to it holds irrespectively of the objects that the object-letters occurring within it refer to.
3.4 Axiom and Theorems
According to the meaning assigned to the functions ξ and ζ ⇒ ξ, from stipulation StHld.GS[FGGPLR] it follows that
the FGGPLR general statement
Ax[FGGPLR].I ‘ a⇒ b⇒ a’
40Insofar as FGGPLR object-letters refer to unspecified objects, a FGGPLR particular statement θ which correspond to a
certain FGGPLR general statement |θ| holds whatsoever objects might be named by the FGGPLR object-letters occurring
within it if and only if this is also the case of any other FGGPLR particular statement θ
′ which correspond to |θ|, since
the conditions under which the statement ‘ Γ ⇒ ¬∆⇒ Γ’ holds are, for example, just the same at those under which the
statements ‘ Γ ⇒ ¬Θ⇒ Γ’ or ‘ Λ ⇒ ¬Ξ⇒ Λ’ hold. Hence, the indefinite article ‘a’ in the following stipulations could be
replaced by the adjective ‘every’ without any alteration of the content of these stipulations.
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holds. Let us take it to be the only axiom of FGGPLR. This renders Frege’s Basic Law I ([18], §§ I.18, 47).
Let also stipulate that:
St Flw.GS[FGGPLR] If |τ |, |θi| (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) are FGGPLR general statements, then |τ | follows from |θ1|,
. . . , |θn| if and only if |τ |, |θi| uniformly correspond to as many FGGPLR particular statements
τ , θi such that τ follows from θ1, . . . , θn41.
This last stipulation can be equivalently restated in a more direct way. To this purpose, call ‘FGGPLR
Roman object-marker’, or, merely ‘FGGPLR object-marker’, for short, that which results from a FGGPLR
term by replacing each distinct FGGPLR object-letter in it with a distinct FGGPLR general letter for
objects ([18], §§ I.17 and I.26; [22], pp. 331 and 441). This is equivalent to calling in this same way that
which results from FGGPLR general statements by omitting the symbol ‘ ’ in front of them. This suggests
restating rules Rl PS[FGGPLR]. i -viii with reference to FGGPLR general statements rather than to FGGPLR
particular statements: it is enough, for this, to rewrite these rules by taking the variables involved in them
to range over FGGPLR object-markers rather than over FGGPLR terms. Let RlGS[FGGPLR]. i -viii be the rules
that are obtained this way. As for the rules RlPS[FGGPLR]. i -viii, let us say that the output of each of them
immediately follows from its input or inputs. While the understanding and application of rules RlGS[FGGPLR].
ii -viiirequire no further explanation, this is not so for RlGS[FGGPLR]. i. To understand and apply it, a definition
of the relation of being an instance of, on FGGPLR particular statements, is needed. To provide it, one
could appropriately adapt stipulations StIs.T[FGGPLR] and St
Is.PS
[FGGPLR]
to FGGPLR object-markers and FGGPLR
particular statements, respectively. Still, it is much easier (and perfectly equivalent) to adopt the following
stipulation:
St Is.GS[FGGPLR] A FGGPLR general statement τ is an instance of a FGGPLR general statement θ if and only
if a FGGPLR particular statement which corresponds to τ is an instance of a FGGPLR particular
statement which corresponds to θ42.
At this point, stipulation StFlw.PS[FGGPLR] can be restated on the model of stipulations St
Flw.GS
[FGGPLR]





. i If θ, ϑ and τ are FGGPLR general statements, τ respectively follows from θ, or





. ii If τ , θi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n), ϑi (i = 1, 2, . . . ,m) are FGGPLR general statements, τ
follows from θ1, θ2, . . . , θn, and θ1 follows from ϑ1, . . . , ϑm, then τ follows from ϑ1, . . . ,




.iii No FGGPLR general statement follows from any number of other FGGPLR general state-







At this point, it only remains to stipulate that:
StTh[FGGPLR] A FGGPLR general statement is a theorem of FGGPLR if and only if it follows from Ax[FGGPLR].I.
41Concerning this stipulation, cf. [25], pp. 60-64.
42Note that, according to this stipulation, any FGGPLR general statement is an instance of itself, just as it happens for
FGGPLR particular statements: cf. footnotes 30 and 33, above.
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3.5 Completeness
Insofar as Ax[FGGPLR].I holds, and the deductive rulesRl
GS
[FGGPLR]
. i-viii are all sound, then any theorem of
FGGPLR holds, and FGGPLR is, itself, sound, and, then, consistent. One can also prove that FGGPLR is
deductively equivalent to a complete modern system of classical propositional logic, and is, then, complete,
in turn.
Consider, for example, the system M, which has been proved to be sound and complete ([32], § I.4),
whose axioms are the following (in modern notation)
Ax[M].i A ⇒ (B ⇒ A)
Ax[M].ii A ⇒ (B ⇒ C)⇒ ((A ⇒ B)⇒ (A ⇒ C))
Ax[M].iii (¬B ⇒ ¬A)⇒ ((¬B ⇒ A)⇒ B)
,
where ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’ are meta-variables ranging on the well-formed formulas of M, and whose single deductive
rule is modus ponens.
To render these axioms within FGGPLR, it is enough to replace in them the meta-variables ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’
with ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’, and the parentheses with ‘−−’, while adding the symbol ‘ ’ in front of each of them. This












.iii ¬b⇒ ¬a⇒ ¬b⇒ a⇒ b
.
The replacement of meta-variables ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’ with ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’ is to go together with the adoption of an
appropriate deductive rule allowing replacements within FGGPLR general statements. Rule RlGS[FGGPLR].i is
perfectly appropriate for this purpose. Once this rule is admitted, the rule of modus ponens for M can be
replaced with a particular case of rule RlGS[FGGPLR]. vi (where ‘
−→κ1 ⇒’, ‘⇒ −→κ2’, and ‘−→κ2 ⇒’ stand for nothing,















.i-iii). This is enough to prove that FGGPLR is complete. Insofar as both M and
FGGPLR are sound, this is also enough for proving that these systems are deductively equivalent, as said
above.
Here is how this can be done:
1. a⇒ b⇒ c⇒ a⇒ b⇒ c⇒ a⇒ b⇒ c RlGS[FGGPLR]. i on Ax[FGGPLR].I
2. a⇒ b⇒ c⇒ a⇒ b⇒ c RlGS[FGGPLR]. v, ii on 1
3. a⇒ b⇒ a⇒ b⇒ a⇒ b RlGS[FGGPLR]. i on Ax[FGGPLR].I
4. a⇒ b⇒ a⇒ b RlGS[FGGPLR]. v, ii on 3
5. a⇒ b⇒ a⇒ a⇒ b⇒ c⇒ a⇒ c RlGS[FGGPLR]. vii, ii on 2,4




.ii a⇒ b⇒ c⇒ a⇒ b⇒ a⇒ c RlGS[FGGPLR]. iii, iii on 6
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1. ¬b⇒ a⇒ ¬b⇒ a⇒ ¬b⇒ a RlGS[FGGPLR].i on Ax[FGGPLR].I
2. ¬b⇒ a⇒ ¬b⇒ a RlGS[FGGPLR].v, ii on 1
3. ¬b⇒ a⇒ ¬a⇒ b RlGS[FGGPLR]. iv on 2
4. ¬b⇒ ¬a⇒ ¬b⇒ a⇒ ¬b⇒ ¬a RlGS[FGGPLR]. i on Ax[FGGPLR].I
5. ¬b⇒ ¬a⇒ ¬b⇒ a⇒ a⇒ b RlGS[FGGPLR]. iv on 4
6. a⇒ ¬b⇒ a RlGS[FGGPLR].i on Ax[FGGPLR].I
7. a⇒ ¬b⇒ ¬a⇒ a⇒ b RlGS[FGGPLR]. vii,ii on 5,6
8. ¬b⇒ ¬a⇒ a⇒ b RlGS[FGGPLR].v, ii, iii on 7




.iii ¬b⇒ ¬a⇒ ¬b⇒ a⇒ b RlGS[FGGPLR]. ii, iii on 9
3.6 Identity
It is not clear whether Frege was aware that, together with the deductive rules we have rendered with
RlGS[FGGPLR]. i-viii, his Basic Law I is enough to deduce all the statements of the language of FGGBS only
involving the functions —ξ, ξ and ξ
ζ
, which holds according to the definitions of these functions
(which is what we have rendered by saying that FGGPLR is complete). What is certain is that, after having
proved, in § I.49, a few very simple propositional theorems from Basic Law I alone, he turned to his other
Basic Laws, and appealed to some of them, namely Basic Laws IIb, III and IV, to prove, in § I.51, other
propositional theorems, whose proof can, in fact, dispense from these laws.
This is the case, for example, of theorems IIIg and IVb, which could be respectively rendered in our
notation thus:
¬a = ¬a and a = ¬¬a.
Taken as such, these are not theorems of FGGPLR, since they are not well-formed formulas of this system,
insofar as they involve the identity function that is not part of it. Still, Frege’s definition of this function
([18], § I.7) immediately suggests different ways of transcribing these theorems within LGS[FGGPLR].
Using our notation, this definition can be rendered as follows:
— ξ = ζ : O2 → {T,F} be such that ∆ = Γ is
{
T if ∆ is Γ
F if ∆ is not Γ
.
By (indirectly) composing this function with ξ (and appropriately extending our suppositions about our
knowing the truth conditions of the statements of the natural language to be used for this purpose), we get
the new function
— ξ = ζ : O2 → {T,F} such that Γ = ∆ is
{
T if Γ is T and ∆ is T or Γ is not T and ∆ is not T
F if Γ is T and ∆ is not T or Γ is not T and ∆ is T
,
which is clearly such that
— ξ = ζ : O2 → {T,F} is such that Γ = ∆ is
{
T if Γ is T and ∆ is T or Γ is F and ∆ is F
F if Γ is T and ∆ is F or Γ is F and ∆ is T
.
It is manifest that the function ξ = ζ, easily obtained from ξ = ζ, is perfectly suitable to play, within
FGGPLR, the same role as that which the connective of double implication plays in modern propositional
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systems. This, together with the remark that Frege himself got his function —ξ = —ζ by indirectly
composing ξ = ζ with —ξ ([18], § I.18), suggest innocently adding to LGS[FGGPLR] the symbol ‘−− ⇔−−’, with
arity 2, by explicitly defining it through the following stipulation:
StGS⇔[FGGPLR] If θ and τ are FGGPLR terms, then ‘θ ⇔ τ ’ stands for ‘¬θ ⇒ τ ⇒ ¬τ ⇒ θ’.
Frege’s theorems IIIg and IVb can, then, be rendered within FGGPLR as follows:
¬a⇔ ¬a and a⇔ ¬¬a.
If one would prefer avoiding adding the symbol ‘−− ⇔−−’ to LGS[FGGPLR], these same theorems could, on
the other hand, more prolixly be rendered thus:
¬¬a⇒ ¬a⇒ ¬¬a⇒ a and ¬a⇒ ¬¬a⇒ ¬¬¬a⇒ a.
The completeness of FGGPLR ensures that all these are theorems of this system, and it is, indeed, quite
easy to prove them. This is, for example, a simple proof of ‘ ¬¬a ⇒ a’ ([32], lemma 1.11(a); cf. ibid.,
lemma 1.11(b), for a proof of ‘ a⇒ ¬¬a’43):




2. ¬a⇒ ¬a⇒ ¬a RlGS[FGGPLR]. i on Ax[FGGPLR].I
3. ¬a⇒ ¬a RlGS[FGGPLR].v,ii on 2
4. ¬a⇒ ¬¬a⇒ a RlGS[FGGPLR]. vi on 1, 3
5. ¬a⇒ ¬¬a⇒ a RlGS[FGGPLR]. ii on 4
6. ¬¬a⇒ ¬a⇒ ¬¬a RlGS[FGGPLR]. i on Ax[FGGPLR].I
7. ¬¬a⇒ a RlGS[FGGPLR]. vii, ii on 5, 6
One could, then, wonder why Frege used Basic Laws III and IV to prove his theorems IIIg and IVb and
some other propositional theorems (for which the same argument can be repeated, mutatis mutandis). It is
quite implausible that he did not see the possibility of deducing appropriate versions of them from Basic Law
43Once ‘ ¬¬a⇒ a’ and ‘ a⇒ ¬¬a’ have been proved, in order to prove ‘ ¬a⇒ ¬¬a⇒ ¬¬¬a⇒ a’, it is enough to apply
to them the following derivation-schema, where θ and τ are FGGPLR terms:
1. θ
2. τ
3. θ RlGS[FGGPLR]. ii on 1
4. τ RlGS[FGGPLR]. ii on 2
5. θ ⇒ ¬τ ⇒ θ ⇒ ¬τ ⇒ θ ⇒ ¬τ RlGS[FGGPLR]. i on Ax[FGGPLR].I
6. θ ⇒ ¬τ ⇒ θ ⇒ ¬τ RlGS[FGGPLR]. v, ii on 5
7. τ ⇒ θ ⇒ ¬θ ⇒ ¬τ RlGS[FGGPLR]. iv on 6
8. θ ⇒ ¬θ ⇒ ¬τ RlGS[FGGPLR]. vi, ii on 4,7
9. ¬θ ⇒ ¬τ RlGS[FGGPLR]. vi, ii on 3,8
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I alone. A more convincing answer is that he was unconcerned with separating the propositional fragment
of his system from the rest of it, as we have argued for in §§ 1 and 2.4. This lack of concern is perfectly











where ‘f ’ is used to indicate first-level functions just as FGGPLR general letters for objects indicate objects.
To this purpose, Frege did not only appeal to theorem IVb, but also to a consequence of Basic Law III (namely
theorem IIIa: ibid., § I.50), drawn from it through an appeal to Basic Law IIb. A simple particularisation
of these theorems, immediately provides the two propositional principles of elimination and introduction of
double negation, mentioned just above. But Frege did not state any new theorem expressing these principles,
namely, neither ‘ a
a
’, nor ‘ a
a
’, which merely involve, nonetheless, the three functions —ξ, ξ and
ξ
ζ
. Clearly, he was not only unconcerned with deducing these theorems from Basic Law I alone; he was
also unconcerned with stating these theorems as such, after having stated the more general theorems IVc
and IVd.
It seems to us that this is strong evidence supporting our claim that Frege was unconcerned with sep-
arating the propositional fragment of his system from the rest of it. Still, the way he proved his theorems
IIIg and IVb, as well as the other propositional theorems involving the function —ξ = —ζ, is also evidence
for another, related claim, namely that Frege considered essential to have a unique identity function, both
applying to objects in general, as it is the case for our identity function, and to truth-values, in particular,
so as to make it able to play the role that we assign to the double implication connector. In other terms,
for him, there was no room for something assimilable to this connector as such: identity, as a total fist-level
function, was rather the crucial tool to be used, and possibly applied to truth-values. This is perfectly in
line both with his universalist conception of logic, and with his conception of its propositional fragment as a
theory of terms referring to truth-values (that is, in the very end, with his conception of truth, and his view
on ontology, i.e. with the idea that the world is made up of objects, without any distinction of status or
type). But it is also a deep reason that plausibly pushed him to consider that a separation of propositional
logic from other departments of logic would have been inappropriate. His being unconcerned with separating
the propositional fragment of his system from the rest of it was then deeply rooted in his way on conceiving
logic, in general, and was not merely a consequence of carelessness.
Still, if, despite all of that, we would like to integrate, the identity function within FGGPLR, we could
certainly do it, by adding to the languages LT[FGGPL], LPS[FGGPLR], and LGS[FGGPLR] the symbol ‘−− =−−’, with
arity 2, agreeing with the previous definition of the functions ξ = ζ and ξ = ζ, so as to get, respectively,
the new languages LT=[FGGPLR], LPS=[FGGPLR], and LGS=[FGGPLR]. To this purpose, we should also amend stipulation
StT[FGGPLR] as follows:
StT=[FGGPLR]. i If θ and τ are FGGPLR object-letters, atomic terms, or terms, then θ, ¬θ, θ ⇒ τ , and θ = τ
are FGGPLR terms;
StT=[FGGPLR]. ii Nothing else is a FGGPLR term.
This would allow to render Basic Law IV with a FGGPLR general statement, to be added to Ax[FGGPLR].I
as a new axiom of FGGPLR:
Ax[FGGPLR].IV ¬a = ¬b⇒ a = b .
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It is clear both that this statement holds, and that it cannot be deduced in FGGPLR from Ax[FGGPLR].I,
since none of the rules RlGS[FGGPLR]. i-viii allow one to introduce the symbol ‘=’. It is also clear that, once
this axiom is admitted, these last rules allow to deduce other statements from it, either alone or together
with Ax[FGGPLR].I, all including this symbol, and, then, all non-deductible from this last axiom alone. In
a sense, adding Ax[FGGPLR].IV to Ax[FGGPLR].I as an axiom of FGGPLR—and consequently amending the
stipulation StTh[FGGPLR] so as to take as a theorem of FGGPLR any FGGPLR general statement that follows
from Ax[FGGPLR].I and Ax[FGGPLR].IV—would, then, result in properly extending this system, without going
beyond the limit of a propositional system. Still, this is not in contradiction with the previous result to the
effect of which FGGPLR is complete. Since for each new theorem that would be obtained this way, there
would be another theorem of FGGPLR, deducible from Ax[FGGPLR].I alone and not involving the function
ξ = ζ, which would correspond to it under the replacement of any FGGPLR object-marker of the form
‘θ = τ ’ with a corresponding FGGPLR object-marker of the form ‘¬θ ⇒ τ ⇒ ¬τ ⇒ θ’. One could then say
that none of the former theorems would be genuinely new44.
4 Frege’s Second-Order System Reconstructed
4.1 From FGGPLR to FGGL2R
Though our presentation of FGGPLR as an autonomous system collides with Frege’s avoiding a clear sep-
aration of the propositional fragment of FGGBS from the other parts of this system, we partially reflect
Frege’s attitude on this matter by rooting FGGL2R in FGGPLR. This is made particularly clear by our
incorporating FGGPLR basic functions into FGGL2R, by also considering the function ξ = ζ with its two
facets, respectively appearing when its arguments are truth-values or objects in general. This is not the
same, however, as merely coming to FGGL2R by extending FGGPLR. The reason is that the generation of
terms in the former system proceeds in a quite different way than in the latter.
As a matter of fact, Frege did not rigourously expose the way in which terms are generated in FGGBS,
but rather used natural language to suggest the way in which they can be obtained from each other.
If we limit ourselves to the propositional fragment of this system, things are clear enough to suggest the
simple clauses we have adopted in FGGPLR. Still, stating these clauses essentially depends on appealing
to FGGPLR object-letters, which, as we have seen above, do not occur within the language LGS[FGGPLR],
which is used to state FGGPLR well-formed formulas. Though the use of these letters is confined neither
to the informal presentation of the basic ideas the system is based on, nor to the definition of its basic
functions (which, from a modern stand-point, could be considered as a purely semantic matter), but is also
indispensable for fixing its syntax, they are, then, so to say, only provisionally called into play. The reason for
this is that FGGPLR is intended to reflect (among other things) Frege’s conception of well-formed formulas
of FGGBS as universal in nature (which is, by the way, a natural outcome of his universalist conception of
logic), and to adhere, then, to his requirement that no atomic object-name be allowed to occur within these
formulas. This requirement entails that the only symbols with arity 0 included in the propositional fragment
of FGGBS that are allowed to occur within these formulas are Roman letters for objects (which correspond
to FGGPLR general letters for objects). When this is coupled with the fact that no term can be formed
by using only these letters together with the other propositional ingredients of FGGBS, this results in the
consequence that the propositional well-formed formulas of FGGBS include no terms (which fits, indeed,
44This raises the problem of the role of Basic Law IV in Frege’s system. The question is quite delicate and we cannot enter
it, here. We simply refer the reader to Landini’s subtle scrutiny of it, leading to the conclusion that this role only appears in a
larger context, involving both the whole FGGBS and the definition of natural numbers within it, namely the proof of (Frege’s
version of) Hume’s principle: cf. [31], §§ 2.4, 2.7, and 4.3.
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with the way these formulas are conceived, namely as statements that are general insofar as they assert that
other statements, namely appropriate classes of particular ones, hold). This is why the language LGS[FGGPLR]
is shaped so as to not only include no terms among its atomic symbols, but also to render impossible the
generation of terms within it. Both provisional atomic terms, and rules to generate other terms from them
are, then, needed, and this is what FGGPLR object-letters are required for.
When one proceeds beyond the restricted limits of the propositional fragment of FGGBS and passes to its
second-order fragment, things change quite crucially, since it is no more true that no term can be formed by
using only the ingredients of this last fragment of FGGBS that are allowed to enter its well-formed formulas.
To anticipate, let us consider two simple examples: ‘ a a’ ‘ f a f (a)’ are term of FGGBS and are
perfectly allowed to enter well-formed formulas of this system. In the second-order fragment of FGGBS,
there are, then, the resources to generate terms by involving neither atomic object-names nor analogous
syntactical resources to be used to designate unspecified functions. It is then natural to shape FGGL2R
so as to avoid having recourse both to FGGPLR object-letters and to analogous function-letters—that is,
letters to be used to form indeterminate function-names—, in order to generate terms45, and, then, using
the upper-case Greek letters ‘Γ’, ‘∆’, ‘Θ’, ‘Λ’, ‘Ξ’, ‘Π’, ‘Σ’, together with other such letters, like ‘Φ’, ‘Ψ’, ‘Ω’
and ‘Υ’—used, indeed, to form indeterminate function-names—only informally, and in the definition of the
basic functions to be added to those involved in FGGPLR. This requires, however, to emphasize a feature of
Frege’s formal language that is somehow kept out of sight in the way terms are generated in FGGPLR. We
refer to the impossibility, in this language, of getting a term by direct composition of two other terms: to get
a term by composing two other terms, one is to pass through a desaturation of one of the latter, and, then,
through a function-name. For example, the two terms ‘Γ ⇒ ∆’ and ‘¬∆’ being given to get the composed
term ‘Γ⇒ ¬∆’, one has to desaturate the former, so as to get the function-name ‘Γ⇒ ξ’, then to saturate46
this function-name with the latter term47.
It follows that the process of generation of terms requires a continuous coming and going from object- to
function-names and vice versa. The propositional fragment of FGGBS can be rendered so as to leave this
coming and going somehow implicit, as it happens in FGGPLR. But, when one passes to the second-order
fragment, and one wants to render it by avoiding to assign any formal role to FGGPLR object-letters and
to analogous function-letters, this coming and going has to be made explicit, and this requires assigning a
45Note that if FGGPLR had been not presented as a separate system, but rather intended as a (non-autonomous) fragment of
FGGL2R, we could have avoided the recourse to FGGPLR object-letters also for generating FGGPLR terms. It would have been
enough, for this, to admit appropriate rules of substitution allowing replacing FGGL2R terms with the Roman letters entering
LGS[FGGPLR]. This would not have been unfaithful to Frege’s original system, since the only objects other than the truth-values
that play an effective role in it are value-ranges (at least in the case where these do not reduce, in turn, to truth-values).
Moreover, §§ I.26-28 of the Grundgesetze, taken together with Frege’s conception of functions, seem to suggest that his dealing
with the propositional functions —ξ, ξ, ξ
ζ
and with the corresponding deductive rules alone—that is, his operating
without any (apparent) consideration of non-propositional ingredients of FGGBS—was only intended for clarity’s sake. This is
another hint to understand the reasons underlying Frege’s avoiding a clear separation of the propositional fragment of FGGBS
from his whole system.
46Here and below we feel free to use the verb ‘to saturate’ and its cognates in order to speak about the formation of terms
or object-markers, which is something Frege did not do with the corresponding German verb ‘sa¨ttigen’ and its cognates, and
we associate this use with that of the verb ‘to desaturate’, which has no German correspondent in the language Frege used in
the Grundgesetze. In similar circumstances, for example in § I.26, Frege respectively used, instead, the verbs ‘to fill [ausfu¨llen]’
and ‘to remove [ausschliessen]’, or rather the verb ‘to replace [ersetzen]’. Still the literal meaning of the first two of these verbs
could be misleading here, since the procedures they are intended to designate are, in fact, much more complex and subtle than
this meaning might suggest (as we hope to make clear by the definition of the procedures for forming terms, and object- and
function-markers we shall offer in §§ 4.3 and 4.4.2, below), and we reserve the third for using it in a more precise way.
47This makes quite clear what Frege was meaning by claiming that “functions with two arguments are just as fundamentally
distinct from functions with one argument as the latter are from objects[. . . ][, f]or, while the latter are fully saturated, functions
with two arguments are less saturated than those with one argument, which are already unsaturated”([18], § I.21; [22], p. 371).
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formal role to other symbols that will not eventually appear in the well-formed formulas of the resulting
system. These symbols include those that are used within function-names to hold places open, namely the
lower-case Greek letters ‘ξ’, ‘ζ’, ‘ϕ’, and other symbols also used in some function-names for another purpose
that will be made clear below, namely the letters ‘β’ and ‘γ’48. It follows that the language of FGGL2R has
to have recourse to provisional symbols that are not eventually allowed to enter its well-formed formulas,
though these are neither FGGPLR object-letters nor analogous function-letters.
This apart, controlling the coming and going from object- to function-names and vice versa is a delicate
task, since this process is manifestly open to a risk of circularity. Without the appropriate provisions, it
could, indeed, require fixing the way function-names are generated in order to fix the way that terms are,
and vice versa. And the task becomes even more delicate if the relevant function-names also include names
of higher-level functions, as it is necessarily the case for the second-order fragment of FGGBS, and for any
rendering of it. Frege didn’t properly show the road toward the solution of the problem, by rather leaving
to a skilful use of natural language, making recourse to the non-better defined notions of a name (either
an object- or a function-name) “forming a part” of another name (either an object or a function-one, too),
and of “removing” the former name from the latter ([18], § I.26; [22], pp. 431-441), the task of informally
describing it, or better of giving a sufficient insight of it. Still, this provides hints for rendering his ideas
through appropriate formal clauses49.
To this purpose, and, in particular, to make these clauses as clear as possible, we list here the different
sort of functions50 entering the process:
F[1,1] First-level functions with one argument, which are saturated by a single object; an indeterminate name
for such a function is ‘Φ (ξ)’, whereas ‘Φ (Γ)’ is a corresponding name of an unspecified value of it; for
short, we denote the totality of these functions51 with ‘F[1,1]’;
F[2,1] First-level functions with two arguments, which are saturated by two objects; an indeterminate name
for such a function is ‘Φ (ξ, ζ)’, whereas ‘Φ (Γ,∆)’ is a corresponding name of an unspecified value of
it; for short, we denote the totality of these functions with ‘F[2,1]’;
F[1,2] Second-level functions with one argument provided by a first-level function with one argument; an
indeterminate name for such a function is ‘Ωβ(ϕ(β))’52, whereas ‘Ωβ(Φ(β))’ is a corresponding name
of an unspecified value of it; we denote the totality of these functions with ‘F[1,2]’;
F[2,2] Second-level functions with one argument provided by a first-level function with two arguments; an
indeterminate name for such a function is ‘Ωβ,γ(ϕ(β, γ))’, whereas ‘Ωβ,γ(Φ(β, γ))’ is a corresponding
name of an unspecified value of it; we denote the totality of these functions with ‘F[2,2]’;
48Cf footnote 52, below.
49These will be inductive in nature. At the time when Grundgesetze was published, inductive clauses and definitions did not
have in syntax the common role they have acquired later and still have today. So we should view his informal indications as a
pioneering achievement rather than as imperfect definitions.
50Rendering the second-order fragment of FGGBS as a modern system of second-order predicate logic would allow one to
avoid the presently unfamiliar distinction between these sorts of functions, by replacing all of them with logical constants (as
in the case of quantifiers) or predicates, possibly of higher-order. This would certainly avoid a difficulty in understanding his
system, but would be very unfaithful both to its general spirit and to many more particular aspects of it.
51Cf. p. 8, above, especially footnote 18.
52Here ‘ϕ’ is intended to hold a place open for the arguments of the second-level function, just like ‘ξ’ and ‘ζ’ do for the
arguments of first-level functions. The double occurrence of ‘β’ is, instead, intended to mean that the argument-place of a
first-level function providing this argument is not held open (since it is filled up either with an object-name, or with a letter
bounded by a quantifier, or by the operator involved in the value-range functions). An analogous notation will also be used
below.
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F[1,3] Third-level functions with one argument provided by a second-level function with one argument pro-
vided by a first-level function with one argument; an indeterminate name for such a function is
‘Υδ (µβ (δ (β)))’53, whereas ‘Υδ (Ωβ (δ (β)))’ is a corresponding name of an unspecified value of it;
we denote the totality of these functions with ‘F[1,3]’;
F[2,3] Third-level functions with one argument provided by a second-level function with one argument pro-
vided by a first-level function with two arguments; an indeterminate name for such a function is
‘Υδ (µβ,γ (δ (β, γ)))’, whereas ‘Υδ (Ωβ,γ (δ (β, γ)))’ is a corresponding name of an unspecified value of
it; we denote the totality of these functions with ‘F[2,3]’.
For reasons we will not discuss here, related to his use of value-ranges, Frege did not need to go further
or to complete this hierarchy by considering functions of level higher than the third, and other sorts of
first-, second-, or third-level functions, or unequal levelled-functions. Functions like the latter—an indeter-
minate name of one of which is, for example, ‘ϕ(ξ)’—are mentioned by Frege ([18], § I.22), but are, in fact,
unnecessary for our task.
4.2 Higher-Level Basic Functions
This hierarchy having been fixed, in general, it is now time to introduce the basic functions of FGGL2R.
Among them, the only first-level ones are the same already involved in FGGPL, namely ξ, ¬ξ, ζ ⇒ ξ and
ξ = ζ, which are then incorporated within FGGPLR, as said above (but note that the arguments of the
function ξ = ζ are now to be intended to be objects in general, and not only values of the function ξ, as
in FGGPL). To these first-level functions, three other basic functions are to be added: ∀aϕ (a), which is a
second-level function with one argument provided by a first-level function with one argument; ∀fµβ (f (β)),
which is a third-level function with one argument provided by a second-level function with one argument
provided by a first-level function with one argument; and ∀fµβ,γ (f (β, γ)), which is a third-level function
with one argument provided by a second-level function with one argument provided by a first-level function
with two arguments.
To define them, let us admit that we know the truth conditions of any statement of the natural language
of the following forms, provided that ‘Γ’ and ‘∆’ are indeterminate object-names:
— ‘∆ is T if Φ (ξ) is such that Φ (Γ) is T whatever object Γ might be, and it is F if Φ (ξ) is not such
that Φ (Γ) is T whatever object Γ might be’;
— ‘∆ is T if Ωβ (ϕ (β)) is such that Ωβ (Φ (β)) is T whatever one-argument first-level function Φ (ξ)
might be, and it is F if Ωβ (ϕ (β)) is not such that Ωβ (Φ (β)) is T whatever one-argument first-level
function Φ (ξ) might be’;
— ‘∆ is T if Ωβ,γ (ϕ (β, γ)) is such that Ωβ,γ (Φ (β, γ)) is T whatever two-arguments first-level
function Φ (ξ, ζ) might be, and it is F if Ωβ,γ (ϕ (β, γ)) is not such that Ωβ,γ (Φ (β, γ)) is T
whatever two-arguments first-level function Φ (ξ, ζ) might be’.
We can define the above-mentioned three basic functions as follows:
— Let ∀aϕ (a) : F[1,1] → {T,F} be such that
∀aΦ (a) is
{
T if Φ (ξ) is such that Φ (Γ) is T whatever object Γ might be
F if Φ (ξ) is not such that Φ (Γ) is T whatever object Γ might be
;
53Here ‘µ’ is intended to hold a place open for the arguments of this third-level function. The double occurrence of ‘δ’ is
intended to mean that the argument-place of a second-level function providing this argument is not held open, instead. Though
third-level functions play an essential role in FGGBS because the second-order universal quantifier is such a function, Frege did
neither emphasise this role, nor explicitly mention these functions. As a consequence, neither the symbols ‘Υ’ and ‘δ’ nor any
other symbol playing the same role as them enter his formal language.
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— Let ∀fµβ (f (β)) : F[1,2] → {T,F} be such that
∀fΩβ (f (β)) is

T
if Ωβ (ϕ (β)) is such that Ωβ (Φ (β)) is T whatever one-argument
first-level function Φ (ξ) might be
F
if Ωβ (ϕ (β)) is not such that Ωβ (Φ (β)) is T whatever one-argument
first-level function Φ (ξ) might be
;
— Let ∀fµβ,γ (f (β, γ)) : F[2,2] → {T,F} be such that
∀fΩβ,γ (f (β, γ)) is

T
if Ωβ,γ (ϕ (β, γ)) is such that Ωβ,γ (Φ (β, γ)) is T whatever
two-arguments first-level function Φ (ξ, ζ) might be
F
if Ωβ,γ (ϕ (β, γ)) is not such that Ωβ,γ (Φ (β, γ)) is T whatever
two-arguments first-level function Φ (ξ, ζ) might be
.
Here the lower-case Gothic letters ‘a’ and ‘f’ have to be intended as changeable parts of the function-
names ‘∀aϕ (a)’, ‘∀fµβ (f (β))’, and ‘∀fµβ,γ (f (β, γ))’. We shall see that it will be convenient to endow them
with an appropriate index, in order to avoid ambiguities.
The functions ∀aϕ (a), ∀fµβ (f (β)), and ∀fµβ,γ (f (β, γ)) render, of course, Frege’s functions a ϕ (a)
([18], § I.8), f µβ (f (β)), and f µβ,γ (f (β, γ)) ([18], § I.19)54, under the assumption that the horizontal
dashes on the two sides of the concavity in ‘ a ’ and ‘ f ’ are occurrences of the horizontal stroke that
also occurs within ‘—ξ’, and can then be considered as a unique stroke by fusion of horizontals.
These functions having been introduced, it is clear how to use them to generate terms that do not include
FGGPL object-letters, by only including symbols that (as we shall see latter, but can be easily understood
already by analogy with FGGPL) are also allowed to enter FGGL2R well-formed formulas. The function ξ
can, for example, provide the argument of ∀aϕ (a), so as to give the value ∀aa, or (by fusion of horizontals)
∀aa, which is nothing but F, and whose name ‘∀aa’ is clearly then a term. Analogously, the function ∀aϕ (a)
can provide the argument of ∀fµβ (f (β)), so as to give the value ∀f∀af (a), which is, again, nothing but F,
and whose name ‘∀f∀af (a)’ is a term, too. Moreover, these two terms, can be taken as names of arguments
of the function ζ ⇒ ξ, so as to get its value ∀aa ⇒ ∀f∀af (a), which is nothing but T, and whose name
‘∀aa ⇒ ∀f∀af (a)’ is also a term. It should be also clear, however, that, by proceeding this way, one could
never get something like ‘∀ff (∀aa)’, which should be, instead, a genuine term of FGGL2R, since it is nothing
but the name of the value of the function ∀fµβ (f (β)) for the second-level function ϕ (∀aa) as argument, which
is, in turn, a genuine second-level function with one argument provided by a first-level function with one
argument55. The problem is that, proceeding in this way, there is no way to get the name of this second-level
function, so as to use it to saturate ‘∀fµβ (f (β))’. To get the term ‘∀ff (∀aa)’, one might rather proceed as
follows: one begins from ‘∀aa ⇒ ∀f∀af (a)’ and analyses it as the name of the value of the one-argument
first-level function ξ ⇒ ∀f∀af (a) for ∀aa as an argument, which reduces to desaturating ‘∀aa ⇒ ∀f∀af (a)’
with respect to ‘∀aa’, so as to get ‘ξ ⇒ ∀f∀af (a)’; then one considers ‘∀aa ⇒ ∀f∀af (a)’ again, but analyses
it, now, as the name of the value of the function ϕ (∀aa) for the function ξ ⇒ ∀f∀af (a) as an argument,
which reduces to desaturating ‘∀aa⇒ ∀f∀af (a)’ with respect to ‘ξ ⇒ ∀f∀af (a)’, so as to get ‘ϕ (∀aa)’; finally,
54Frege’s definition of these two latter functions is not detailed at all, in fact. He merely suggests it by introducing Gothic
“function-letters”to be used in an analogous way as Gothic “object-letters” ([18], § I.19; [22], pp. 341-351).
55This is nothing but the function ϕ (Γ) under the condition that Γ is ∀aa¯, which, as said just above, is nothing but F.
The appeal to this function is made perfectly rightful by having defined the function ∀fµβ (f (β)) on the whole totality F[1,2],
in agreement with Frege’s universalist conception, and independently of any restriction that this totality might plausibly be
submitted to (since ‘ϕ (Γ)’ is a perfectly admissible function-name in any language suitable for rendering the language of
FGGBS), which is made manifested, by the way, by Frege’s appealing to the FGGL2R Roman function-marker ‘ϕ (a) ⇒ ϕ (b)’
in his derivation of theorem IIIa ([18], § I.50; for the notion of Roman FGGL2R function-marker, cf. sections 4.4, below).
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one takes the value of ∀fµβ (f (β)) for ϕ (∀aa) as an argument, which reduces to saturating ‘∀fµβ (f (β))’ with
‘ϕ (∀aa)’, so as to get ‘∀ff (∀aa)’, as required.
This example, should be enough to show the complexity of the process to be followed in order to get
all the terms that one should be able to get within (the language of) FGGL2R, by avoiding any provisional
appeal to letters to be used to designate unspecified objects or functions. Such a process crucially differs
both from the one that we followed to generate FGGPLR terms, for it involves no appeal to such letters, and
from the one that is usually followed in a modern system of logic, since it depends on a continuous coming
and going from object- to function-names and vice versa56.
4.3 Terms and Particular Statements
All this being said, it is now time to leave any preliminary apart and proceed to fix the system FGGL2R,
by beginning with fixing its terms. The best way to do it is not by stating the clauses according to which
the elements of a certain formal language, intended as a collection of atomic symbols having a certain arity,
can be composed with each others so as to get such a term, as we have done for FGGPLR terms. It is much
more appropriate to identify these terms with the elements of a stratified family T of strings of symbols
generated step by step according to a codified procedure involving six other stratified families F[i,j] (i = 1, 2;
j = 1, 2, 3) of strings of symbols, also generated step by step according to this same procedure, which are
intended to include, in turn, names of functions respectively belonging to F[i,j]. What is to be done is, then,
to describe this procedure and the way in which the families T, F[i,j] are progressively constituted according
to it.
To this purpose, let us look at each of these families as the indefinite union of the sub-families of its strings







F[i,j]n , where, for any n, Tn and F
[i,j]
n are, respectively, the sub-families of T and F[i,j] including
the strings generated at step n. Supposing that C is any collection of symbols, let us, then, call ‘C string’
a string of symbols composed only by symbols belonging to C, and focus, in particular, on the collection
CT[FGGL2R] = {ai, fi, (, ), −−,¬−−,−−⇒−−,=,∀} (i = 1, 2, . . .). Let us also admit that, for that which pertains
to the functions ¬ξ and ζ ⇒ ζ (and their values, or the relative FGGL2R Roman object- or function-markers
: cf. § 4.4, below), the notion of occurrence of a CT[FGGL2R] ∪ {ξ, ζ, ϕ} string (or, analogously, a COM[FGGL2R]
string: cf. § 4.4.2, below) within another such string meets the same conditions informally explained in § 3.2
for FGGPLR object-letters or terms, together with the two other following ones: if ‘∀aiθ’ and ‘∀fiθ’ are such
a string (for any i), then the sub-string θ occurs in them, whereas θ does not. This having been stated, let
us stipulate that:











F[2,1] only includes CT[FGGL2R] ∪ {ξ, ζ} strings, within which ‘ξ’ and ‘ζ’ actually occurs at least
once each, and F[2,1]0 =
{
ζ ⇒ ξ, (ξ) = (ζ)}57;
56Another thing to be noted is that, in this way, a term can be generated in several different ways starting from other terms,
which is different from what happens in modern systems of logic.






F[1,2] only includes CT[FGGL2R] ∪ {ϕ} strings, within which ‘ϕ’ actually occurs at least once and










F[2,2] only includes CT[FGGL2R] ∪ {ϕ} strings, within which ‘ϕ’ actually occurs at least once and






























These families having been so described, in general, in order to describe the procedure allowing to









0 , one has to clarify Frege’s notion of a name forming a part of another name (cf. p. 31, above).
St Fr.Pt.(T,F)[FGGL2R] If, for any n, τ and υ are two strings respectively included in Tn and F
[1,1]
n , then:
St Fr.Pt.(T,F)[FGGL2R] . i A string θ included in Tn forms a part of τ if and only if it occurs at least once
within τ ;
St Fr.Pt.(T,F)[FGGL2R] . ii A string θ included in F
[1,1]
n forms a part of τ , through the CT[FGGL2R] strings ϑ and
ϑ′, if and only if ϑ′ results from replacing in θ all occurrences of ‘ξ’ with ϑ, and ϑ′ occurs at least
once within τ ;
St Fr.Pt.(T,F)[FGGL2R] . iii A string θ included in F
[2,1]
n forms a part of τ , through the CT[FGGL2R] strings ϑ,
ϑ′and ϑ′′, if and only if ϑ′′ results from replacing in θ all occurrences of ‘ξ’ with ϑ and of all
occurrences of ‘ζ’ with ϑ′, and ϑ′′ occurs at least once within τ ;
St Fr.Pt.(T,F)[FGGL2R] . iv A string θ included in Tn forms a part of υ if and only if it occurs at least once
within υ.
No other case is to be considered in order for us to proceed with our description.
Let us fix, now, the way the strings included in Tn+1, F
[i,j]







F[i,j]k at step n + 1 of the procedure, for any n. This is done through the following
stipulations, where we write, for short, ‘T0→n’ and ‘F
[i,j]







58For the sake of simplicity, again, in the present section, we follows a policy analogous to that followed in section 3, above
concerning meta-variables (cf. footnote 29, above): we take the liberty of using some meta-variables intended to range over
CT[FGGL2R] ∪ {ξ, ζ, ϕ, µ, β, γ} strings, in order to form other strings of symbols involving, together with these meta-variables, also
some symbols of this same collection. In this case, we assume, anew, that these last symbols refer to themselves as symbols of
the object-language, and avoid any use of quotation marks.
59Note that this is not the same as requiring that ϑ is included in T, since it is not only obvious that T does not include any
CT[FGGL2R] string, but also that some of the CT[FGGL2R] strings, that are not included in T could play the role of ϑ in the present
condition. To take a simple example, ‘a1’ is a CT[FGGL2R] string but is not included in T, and ‘ϕ (a1)’ is a rightful instance of
ϕ (ϑ).
60These two families of strings, including a string each, could, in fact, be eliminated without any consequence on the procedure
of the generation of terms and of function-names. We include them here only for sake of completeness, since the strings they
include are names of the two second-order quantifiers.
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St Tn+1[FGGL2R] A string of symbols θ to be included in Tn+1 is generated at step n+ 1 if and only if one of the
following conditions obtains:
St Tn+1[FGGL2R].i θ results from a string included in F
[1,1]
0→n by replacing, in it all occurrences of ‘ξ’ with a
string included in T0→n;
St Tn+1[FGGL2R]. ii θ results from a string included in F
[2,1]
0→n by respectively replacing in it all occurrences
of ‘ξ’ and of ‘ζ’ with a string of symbols included in T0→n;
St Tn+1[FGGL2R]. iii θ results from a string υ2 included in F
[1,2]
0→n by replacing in it all occurrences of
ϕ(ϑ), where ϑ is a CT[FGGL2R] string which involves the same number of opening and of closing
parentheses, with the CT[FGGL2R] string ϑ′, which results, in turn, from a string υ1 included in
F[1,1]0→n by replacing in it all occurrences of ‘ξ’ with ϑ; if within ϑ a Gothic letter occurs, which also
occurs within υ1 with the same index, one has to preventively replace in υ1 all occurrences of it
with the same Gothic letter with another index such that this letter occurs with this latter index
neither in ϑ, nor in υ1, nor in υ2;
St Tn+1[FGGL2R]. iv θ results from a string υ2 included in F
[2,2]
0→n by replacing in it all occurrences of
ϕ(ϑ, ϑ′), where ϑ and ϑ′ are CT[FGGL2R] strings which involve the same number of opening and of
closing parentheses, with the CT[FGGL2R] string ϑ′′, which results, in turn, from a string υ1 included
in F[2,1]0→n by replacing in it all occurrences of ‘ξ’ and ‘ζ’ respectively with ϑ and ϑ
′; if within ϑ or ϑ′
a Gothic letter occurs, which also occurs within υ1 with the same index, one has to preventively
replace in υ1 all occurrences of it with the same Gothic letter with another index such that this
letter occurs with this latter index neither in ϑ, nor in ϑ′, nor in υ1, nor in υ2;
St Tn+1[FGGL2R]. v θ is a string like ∀fmϑ, where ϑ is a CT[FGGL2R] string that results from a string υ
included in F[1,2]0→n by replacing in it all occurrences of ‘ϕ’ with ‘fm’, and m is any index such that
‘fm’ does not occur within υ;
St Tn+1[FGGL2R]. vi θ is a string like ∀fmϑ, where ϑ is a CT[FGGL2R] string that results from a string υ
included in F[2,2]0→n by replacing in it all occurrences of ‘ϕ’ with ‘fm’, and m is any index such that






A string of symbols θ to be included in F[1,1]n+1 is generated at step n+ 1 if and only if θ results
from a string υ included in T0→n by replacing some (possibly all) occurrences of a CT[FGGL2R] string ϑ






A string of symbols θ to be included in F[2,1]n+1 is generated at step n+ 1 if and only if θ results
from a string υ included in F[1,1]0→n by replacing some (possibly all) occurrences of a CT[FGGL2R] string ϑ






A string of symbols θ to be included in F[1,2]n+1 is generated at step n+ 1 if and only if θ results
from a string τ included in T0→n by respectively replacing in it some (possibly all) occurrences of some
CT[FGGL2R] strings ϑi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n; where n is whatever natural number) with ϕ(ϑ′i), provided that
ϑ′i be some CT[FGGL2R] strings such that a certain CT[FGGL2R] ∪ {ξ} string υ (the same for any value of i)
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A string of symbols θ to be included in F[2,2]n+1 is generated at step n + 1 if and only if θ results
from a string τ included in T0→n by respectively replacing in it some (possibly all) occurrences of some
CT[FGGL2R] strings ϑi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n; where n is whatever natural number) with ϕ(ϑ′i, ϑ′′i ), provided that
ϑ′i and ϑ
′′
i be some CT[FGGL2R] strings such that a certain CT[FGGL2R] ∪ {ξ, ζ} string υ (the same for any




These stipulations having been stated, we can now formalise, what we have informally announced above:
StT[FGGL2R] A CT[FGGL2R] string θ is a FGGL2R term if and only if it is included in Tn, for some n (i.e., it is
included in T)63;
StFN[FGGL2R] A CT[FGGL2R]∪{ξ, ζ, ϕ, µ, β, γ} string is a FGGL2R function-name, designating a function included
in F[i,j] (i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2, 3), if and only if it is included in F[i,j]n , for some n (i.e., it is included in
F[i,j]).
These two last stipulations, together with the previous ones concerning the strings to be included in
Tn and F
[i,j]
n (i = 1, 2: j = 1, 2, 3) implicitly fix the rules according to which the symbols of CT[FGGL2R] ∪
{ξ, ζ, ϕ, µ, β, γ} have to be composed to give rise to FGGL2R terms and function-names, by also determining
their arity. It follows that these stipulations transform this collection in a formal language. Let LT,FN[FGGL2R]
be this language.
The stipulations concerning the strings of symbols to be included in F[i,j]n (i = 1, 2: j = 1, 2, 3), together
with the definitions of the basic functions entail that the function-names that are allowed to be formed
within this language do not necessarily designate a function with values in {T, F}, that is, a concept or a
relation, in Frege’s parlance. A simple example is given by the one-argument first-level function ξ (namely the
one-argument identity function, whose value is the same object as its argument, for whatsoever argument),





, from the FGGL2R
term ‘∀f1∀a1f1 (a1)’ (supposing that ϑ is ‘∀f1∀a1f1 (a1)’ itself), which belongs, in turn, to T1, since it is
obtained, according to stipulation StTn+1[FGGL2R]. v, from the CT[FGGL2R] ∪ {ϕ} string ∀a1ϕ(a1) included in F
[1,2]
0
(and working as υ in this stipulation). It does not follow, however, that FGGL2R terms include names of
objects other than the truth-values. To obtain such a term from this last function, as a name of a value of it,
one should already have this same term available among FGGL2R terms, and, mutatis mutandis, the same
happens for any other FGGL2R function-name (either for those that designate a concept or a relation or for
61Let us suppose that, in this clause, one takes τ and υ to be, respectively, ‘∀a1a1 ⇒ ∀a2a2 ⇒ ∀a2a2’ and ‘ξ ⇒ ∀a2a2’, and i = 1.
One can, then, take ϑ1 to be ‘∀a1a1 ⇒ ∀a2a2 ⇒ ∀a2a2’, so that ϑ′1 will be ‘∀a1a1 ⇒ ∀a2a2’ and θ will be ‘ϕ(∀a1a1 ⇒ ∀a2a2)’.
But one might also take ϑ to be ‘∀a1a1 ⇒ ∀a2a2’, so that ϑ′ will be ‘∀a1a1’ and θ will be ‘ϕ (∀a1a1) ⇒ ∀a2a2’. Note that,
though both these two options are allowed, one cannot begin by the first one, so as to get ‘ϕ(∀a1a1 ⇒ ∀a2a2)’ and then observe





’, since this clause only allows one to get function-names from FGGL2R terms, and not from other function-names.
More generally, no string ϕ(θ), such that ‘ϕ’ occurs in θ can be generated according to this or any other of our clauses. No such
string is, then, a function-name admissible in FGGL2R. This agrees with Frege’s rejection of direct composition of functions.
62Here also, one can have different possible choices for the application of this clause on two given strings taken as τ and υ, as





: cf. footnote 61, above.
63It is easy to verify that, according to this stipulation, any FGGL2R term is a particular term, just as it happens with
FGGPLR terms, as observed above, p. 22.
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those that do not): no such name is such that the previous clauses allow to generate, out from it and from
other FGGL2R function-names or terms, a term naming an object other than a truth-value. Hence, though
the functions that one can name using LT,FN[FGGL2R] (and that seem, then, to be unquestionably ascribable
to the totalities F[i,j]n ) include functions other than concepts an relations, no value of these other functions
other than a truth-value can be named using LT,FN[FGGL2R]. To form a name of an object other than a truth-




object-names, namely with FGGPL object-letters, by also admitting that the unspecified objects named by
them include objects other than truth-values. By coming back, then to a situation close to that of FGGLP.
This move would not be faithful to Frege, however, since, also in the language of FGGBS, indeterminate
object-names enter only as preliminary tools. The good way to name such other objects in this language is
rather by appealing to the value-range and the definite description functions. It is only the introduction of
these functions that makes plausible the admission that the objects that FGGBS is dealing with go beyond
T and F. This is certainly a reason why Frege did not think of the second-order fragment of his system as a
separate system of logic. So conceived, it would have had a quite poor expressive power.
This having been said, let us come back to the formal presentation of FGGL2R, namely to its particular
statements. To to allow their formation, it is enough to add to LT,FN[FGGL2R] the symbol ‘ ’, so as to get





. The passage from FGGL2R terms to FGGL2R particular
statements is, indeed, governed, mutatis mutandis, by the same stipulations that govern the passage from
FGGPLR terms to FGGPLR particular statements:
StPS[FGGL2R]. i If θ is a FGGL2R term, then θ is a FGGL2R particular statement.
StPS[FGGL2R]. ii Nothing else is a FGGL2R particular statement.
The understanding of FGGL2R particular statements is, mutatis mutandis, the same as that of FGGPLR
particular statements. If θ is a FGGL2R particular statement, let us say that θ is its FGGL2R term, and
stipulate that:
St As.PS[FGGL2R] A FGGL2R particular statement asserts that the truth-value named by its FGGL2R term is T;
St Hld.PS[FGGL2R] A FGGL2R particular statement holds if its FGGL2R term is a name of T; and it does not hold
if its FGGL2R term is a name of F.
Concerning the way they are respectively connected to FGGPLR and FGGL2R terms, FGGL2R particular
statements are, then, perfectly analogous to FGGPLR ones. The essential difference between FGGPLR and
FGGL2R particular statements merely depends on the essential difference between FGGPLR and FGGL2R
terms, which we have discussed in § 4.1, above. As a consequence, whereas FGGPLR particular statements
cannot be considered as FGGL2R well-formed formulas, there is no reason to stay away from taking FGGL2R
particular statements as FGGL2R well-formed formulas. We shall come back to this in § 4.5, below.
4.4 Roman Object- and Function-Marks
4.4.1 Preliminary Explanations
The difference between FGGPLR and FGGL2R terms has another important consequence on the difference
between FGGPLR and FGGL2R particular statements. Indeed, these statements have different roles in
the derivations within FGGPLR and FGGL2R, respectively. Since, the fact that in FGGL2R particular
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statements involve neither FGGPLR object-letters, nor analogous function-letters (cf. p. 30, above) not only
allows one to consider these statements as FGGL2R well-formed formulas, but also forbids to define the
relation of being an instance of, on these formulas, and to state the corresponding rule of substitution by
relying on these object- and function-letters.
The problem concerns the expression of generality in FGGBS, and, consequently, in FGGPLR and in
FGGL2R. In FGGPLR, generality is expressed through Roman letters. These letters play an analogous role
also in FGGL2R, but generality is expressed, there, by the functions ∀aϕ (a), ∀fµβ (f (β)), and ∀fµβ,γ (f (β, γ)),
that, as we have seen, essentially occur, through their values, within FGGL2R particular statements. This
second way of expressing generality is limited to a term or a statement, but does not extend to a deriva-
tion, since the scope of a quantification cannot go beyond FGGL2R terms or FGGL2R statements (and
this independently of their being particular or general terms or statements, as will be clear below). The
point is clearly made by Frege himself in § I.17 of the Grundgesetze: though both ‘ a a4 = 1
a2 = 1
’ and
‘ a a8 = 1
a4 = 1
’ are particular statements, the latter cannot be derived from the former in agreement with
any of the inference rules we rendered through RlPS[FGGPLR]. i -viii. The way Frege overcame the difficulty is
not by introducing new inference rules concerned with the functions ∀aϕ (a), ∀fµβ (f (β)), and ∀fµβ,γ (f (β, γ)),
analogous to the modern rules of universal instantiation and generalisation64. Frege, rather, argued that the
general propositions65 expressed by ‘ a a4 = 1
a2 = 1
’ and ‘ a a8 = 1
a4 = 1
’ can also be expressed by ‘ a4 = 1
a2 = 1
’
and ‘ a8 = 1
a4 = 1













’ be taken as instances of ‘—a’, ‘—b’ and ‘—c’, for example.
Frege’s example is quite simple, and his point quite clear. But the simplicity of the example hides the
essential point. To present this example, Frege took the liberty to designate by ‘1’ and ‘ξ2’, ‘ξ4’, ‘ξ8’ an
object (other than a truth-value) and three functions that are not introduced in the previous parts of his
treatise. He clearly entrusted the informal knowledge of the reader the responsibility of giving a sense to these
names. But this knowledge cannot force the statements ‘ a4 = 1
a2 = 1
’ and ‘ a8 = 1
a4 = 1













’ to belong to the propositional fragment of FGGBS, and this not
only since the object 1 and the functions ξ2, ξ4, and ξ8 are not defined there, but also and overall, because
these latter functions are not propositional in nature. In our rendering, this means that there is no way to
extend FGGPL, while remaining in the limits of a propositional system, so as to make that the statements
‘ a2 = 1⇒ a4 = 1’, ‘ a4 = 1⇒ a8 = 1’ and their components ‘a2 = 1’, ‘a4 = 1’ and ‘a8 = 1’ belong to the
relevant extension of this system. These statements and components are inescapably non-propositional in
nature. But, if, as we have seen, going beyond FGGPL entails also abandoning a non-purely informal use of
FGGPL object-letters and of analogous function-letters, then one cannot hope to rely on these last letters
to explain the passage from ‘ a2 = 1 ⇒ a4 = 1’, ‘ a4 = 1 ⇒ a8 = 1’ to ‘ a ⇒ b’, ‘ b ⇒ c’, and, then, the
64Indeed a rule close to universal generalisation is admitted in FGGBS, and introduced, some line below, in § I.17 (we shall
introduce its rendering in FGGL2R in § 4.5), but, alone, it is not suitable for this purpose. If an analogue of the theorem of
deduction is admitted, his Basic Laws IIa and IIb are moreover close to the first- and second-order rules of universal instantiation
(we shall come back to them in § 4.6). But their use in deduction depends on the definition of the relation of being an instance
of, on the well-formed formulas of his system, which depends, in turn, on the solution of the difficulty that is here at stake.
65Of course, Frege did not appeal to a notion such as that of proposition, and was quite elusive on this matter. Using this
notion appears to us as the simplest way to make his point explicit, however.
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application to the former statements of the rule RlGS[FGGPLR]. vi. To account for Frege’s simple argument,
one then has to, either admit a formal (though preliminary) use of FGGPL object-letters and of analogous
function-letters within FGGL2R, or to look for a way other than that involved in FGGPL of conceiving the
relation of being an instance of, on FGGPL well-formed formulas, and the corresponding rule of substitution.
If the former option is discarded (in agreement with what was said above), then the latter only remains,
which means that, within FGGL2R, this relation and this rule are to be fixed by directly appealing to Roman
letters.
Frege gave an hint about how to do this when he introduced the notions of a Roman object-marker and
of a Roman function-marker ([18], §§ I.17 and I.26; [22], pp. 331 and 441). We have already appealed to the
former in § 3.3.2 (p. 24), and explained it by having recourse to FGGPLR object-letters. Still, if these letters
are no longer available, this explanation cannot be maintained. In § I.26 Frege defined these markers as that
which “we obtain”, if “we replace”, respectively in an object- and in a function- name, object-names and
function-names that “form a part” of the former names with appropriate Roman letters. Though apparently
quite simple, this definition is, in fact, far from clear, when it is transposed in FGGL2R. Clarifying it
requires fixing a new generating procedure for FGGL2R Roman object- and function-markers (or merely
FGGL2R object- and function-markers, for short), parallel to the one expounded above for FGGL2R terms
and function-names. This is what we shall do in the next § 4.4.2. Before doing it, some other examples are
in order to help in understanding both the nature and role of FGGL2R object- and function-marker and the
way this generating procedure works.
Consider the general statement ‘ a = a’66. If one replaces ‘a’ with any object-name ‘Γ’, one gets
‘ Γ = Γ’, which is a particular statement. But one can also replace ‘a’ with ‘b⇒ b’, so as to get ‘ (b⇒ b) =(
b⇒ b)’, which is a new general statement. Here, the generality expressed by ‘a’ covers, as it were, the
generality expressed by ‘b’ and ‘b ⇒ b’, and this makes ‘ (b⇒ b) = (b⇒ b)’ follows from ‘ a = a’ as an
instance of it. This fits with stipulation StIs.GS[FGGPLR], which allows a FGGPLR general statement to be an
instance of another such statement. A difference with the case of FGGPLR is, instead, that within FGGL2R,
general statements also admit instances provided by particular statements, so that the latter can follow from
the former. For example, the particular statement ‘ ∀a1a1 = ∀a1a1’ is an instance of ‘ a = a’, and follows
from it. Another difference is that, within FGGL2R, general statements can also involve Roman letters for
functions. These work as Roman letters for objects, but indicate functions, rather than objects. Among
them, there are the letters ‘f ’, used to indicate first-level functions, and ‘M ’, used to indicate second-level
functions. For example, ‘ f (a) = f (a)’, ‘ f (∀aa) = f (∀aa)’, and ‘ ∀f1Mβ (f1 (β)) = ∀f1Mβ (f1 (β))’ are
all FGGL2R general statements involving these letters.
Now, like FGGPLR object-markers are components of FGGPLR general statements, FGGL2R object-
markers are components of FGGL2R general statements. In particular, the FGGL2R general statements
‘ a = a’ and ‘
(
b⇒ b) = (b⇒ b)’ involve the FGGPLR object-markers ‘a’, ‘a = a’, ‘b’, ‘b ⇒ b’ and
‘
(
b⇒ b) = (b⇒ b)’, whereas the FGGL2R general statements f (a) = f (a)’, ‘ f (∀aa) = f (∀aa)’ and
‘ ∀f1Mβ (f1 (β)) = ∀f1Mβ (f1 (β))’ involve the FGGPLR object-markers ‘f (a)’, ‘f (a) = f (a)’, ‘f (∀aa)’,
‘f (∀aa) = f (∀aa)’, ‘∀f1Mβ (f1 (β))’ and ‘∀f1Mβ (f1 (β)) = ∀f1Mβ (f1 (β))’. It is, then, enough to consider that
‘f (a)’, ‘f (∀aa)’ and ‘∀f1Mβ (f1 (β))’ are all instances of ‘a’ to conclude that all these last three statements
are instances of ‘ a = a’, and follow from it.
It is, moreover, enough to consider that the FGGL2R term ‘∀aa = a ⇒ ∀aa’ is, in turn, an instance
of the FGGL2R object-marker ‘f (∀aa)’, to conclude that the FGGL2R particular statement ‘ ∀aa = a ⇒
∀aa = ∀aa = a⇒ ∀aa’ is an instance of ‘ f (∀aa) = f (∀aa)’, and follows from it. To get this term from this
66Note that here the symbol ‘=’ pertains to the function ξ = ζ, not to the function ξ = ζ involved in the extension of FGGPLR
considered in § 3.6.
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FGGL2R object-marker, one has to instantiate, in the latter, ‘f (ξ)’ with the function-name ‘∀aa = a⇒ ξ’.
Now, just like ‘f (∀aa)’ is a FGGL2R object-marker, ‘f (ξ)’ is a FGGL2R function-marker for first-level
functions. This is also the case of ‘g (ξ)’ and ‘g
(
ξ ⇒ ∀aa)’, since ‘g’ is another Roman letter for first-level
functions. Both these last FGGL2R function-markers can be used to instantiate ‘f (ξ)’, in ‘f (∀aa)’, again, so
as to pass from this last FGGL2R object-marker to its two new instances ‘g (∀aa)’ and ‘g
(∀aa⇒ ∀aa)’. It fol-
lows that also the FGGL2R general statements ‘ g (∀aa) = g (∀aa)’ and ‘ g
(∀aa⇒ ∀aa) = g (∀aa⇒ ∀aa)’
are instances of ‘ f (∀aa) = f (∀aa)’, and follow, then, from it.
Finally, it is enough to consider that the FGGL2R term ‘∀f1∀a1f1 (a1)’ is an instance of the FGGL2R
object-marker ‘∀f1Mβ (f1 (β))’ to conclude that the FGGL2R particular statement ‘ ∀f1∀a1f1 (a1) = ∀f1∀a1f1 (a1)’
is, instead, an instance of ‘ ∀f1Mβ (f1 (β)) = ∀f1Mβ (f1 (β))’, and follows, then, from it. To get this term
from this FGGL2R object-marker, one has to instantiate, in the latter, ‘Mβ (f1 (β))’ with the function-name
‘∀a1ϕ (a1)’. Hence, so as ‘f (ξ)’ is a FGGL2R function-marker for first-level functions, ‘Mβ (ϕ (β))’ is a
FGGL2 function-marker for second-level functions.
Besides showing the nature of FGGL2 function-markers, these last examples should also make clear that
FGGL2 function-markers play a crucial role in derivations within FGGL2. Insofar as they include the letters
‘ξ’, ‘ζ’, and ‘ϕ’, used to hold a place open for appropriate arguments (the absence of ‘ζ’ in the foregoing
examples merely depends on the fact that, for the sake of simplicity, these examples are so chosen as to
involve no two-arguments first-level function), this entails that also these last letters play a crucial role in
derivations within FGGL2R, in spite of the fact that they do not occur within FGGL2R well-formed formulas.
This induces a crucial structural difference between derivations within FGGL2R and derivations within both
FGGPLR and modern systems of logic.
4.4.2 Formal Treatment
Let be COM[FGGL2R] = CT[FGGL2R] ∪ {a, b, c, d, . . . , f, g, h, . . . ,M, . . . , β, γ, . . . , }, where the ellipses are intended
to remain for the same letters ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’, ‘d’, ‘f ’, ‘g’, ‘h’, ‘M ’, ‘β’, ‘γ’ endowed with appropriate indexes.
Call, for short, ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’, ‘d’,. . . ‘FGGL2R general letters for objects’, ‘f ’, ‘g’, ‘h’,. . . ‘FGGL2R general
letters for first-level functions’ and ‘M ’,. . . ‘FGGL2R general letters for second-level functions’, and ‘β’, ‘γ’,
,. . . ‘FGGL2R bounding letters’ (these last letters are used as above 67). We shall define FGGL2R object-







FR[i,j]n (i, j = 1, 2) progressively generated according to an inductive
procedure that differs from that according to which the families T and F[i,j] (i, j = 1, 2) are generated, only





0 as their proper sub-families. It results that also the whole families TR and FR
[i,j] respectively
contain T and F[i,j] as their proper sub-families, just as well as, for any n, TRn and FR
[i,j]
n respectively
contain Tn and F
[i,j]
n as their proper sub-families. FGGL2R object- and function-markers will be, more
precisely, identified with the strings included in TR and FR[i,j] but not in T and F[i,j]68.
We begin by stipulating that:
StTR[FGGL2R] TR only includes COM[FGGL2R] strings, and TR0 = T0 ∪ {a, b, c, d, . . .} = {a, b, c, d, . . .};
67Cf footnote (52) above.
68The reason for proceeding this way, by first extending Tn and F
[i,j]
n an then taking away these same families from their
extensions is, of course, that FGGL2R terms and function-names enter the process of generation of FGGL2R object- and





FR[1,1] only includes COM[FGGL2R]∪{ξ} strings, within which ‘ξ’ actually occurs at least once, and
FR[1,1]0 = F
[1,1]
0 ∪ {f (ξ) , g (ξ) , h (ξ) , . . .} =
{




FR[2,1] only includes COM[FGGL2R] ∪ {ξ, ζ} strings, within which ‘ξ’ and ‘ζ’ actually occurs at least
once each, and FR[2,1]0 = F
[1,1]
0 ∪{f (ξ, ζ) , g (ξ, ζ) , h (ξ, ζ) , . . .} =
{




FR[1,2] only includes COM[FGGL2R]∪{ϕ} strings, within which ‘ϕ’ actually occurs at least once and
always within a sub-string ϕ(ϑ), and FR[1,2]0 = F
[1,2]
0 ∪{Mβ (ϕ (β)) , . . .} =
{






FR[2,2] only includes COM[FGGL2R] ∪ {ϕ} strings, within which ‘ϕ’ actually occurs at least once





{Mβ,γ (ϕ (β, γ)) , . . .} = {Mβ,γ (ϕ (β, γ)) , . . .} 69.
As we have just said, the strings included in TRn+1, FR
[i,j]







FR[i,j]k at step n+1 of the procedure, for any n, in the same way as for the families
Tn+1, F
[i,j]
























, by replacing in them all occurrences of ‘R’ with ‘TR’,
all occurrences of ‘F’ with ‘FR’, and all occurrences of ‘CT[FGGL2R] ’ with ‘COM[FGGL2R] ’, so as to get the new
























This enables us to define FGGL2R object- and or function-markers as we have announced:
St OM[FGGL2R].i A COM[FGGL2R] string is an FGGL2R object-marker if and only if it is included in the family TR
but not in T;
St T[FGGL2R].ii A COM[FGGL2R] ∪ {ξ, ζ, ϕ} string is an FGGL2R function-marker if and only if it is included in
one of the families FR[i,j] (i; j = 1, 2), but in none of the families F[i,j].
We are now able to define the relation of being an instance of, on FGGL2R terms and object-markers70:
69The ellipses here and in the previous stipulation StFR
[1,2]
[FGGL2R]
stand for the same strings that precede them, in which ‘M ’,
‘β’, ‘γ’ are endowed with appropriate indexes. Hence, indexation apart, the strings ‘Mβ (ϕ (β))’, . . . and ‘Mβ,γ (ϕ (β, γ))’, . . . ,












[2,3], by omitting ‘∀f1’ and replacing ‘µ’ with ‘M ’, which corresponds to pass from a way to express















in our hierarchy: cf. footnote 60, above.




StIs.OM,T[FGGL2R] i-vi render, with some slight differences and a more important generalisation, Frege’s rules 9 and 10 of § I.48, namely
the rules of citation of statements relative to replacement of Roman and Gothic letters, respectively. The generalisation depends
on the possibility, licensed by stipulations StIs.OM,T[FGGL2R] v -vi, of replacing FGGL2R general letters for second-level functions with
appropriate function-names in whatever FGGL2R object-markers and general statements in which such a letter occurs, which
contrasts with Frege’s licensing this replacement (through his rule 9 of § I.48) only in Basic Law IIb (cf. § 4.6, below). This
restriction depends, indeed, on no intrinsic necessity relative to FGGBS, and is merely motivated by the fact that no other such
replacement is necessary to perform the derivation included in Frege’s treatise.
42
StIs.T[FGGL2R] If τ and τ
′ are FGGL2R terms, and if τ ′ is the same term as τ or results from τ by replacing
in it all occurrences of a Gothic letter for objects or for functions respectively with a Gothic letter for
objects or for functions which does not occur within τ , then τ ′ is an instance of τ ;
StIs.OM,T[FGGL2R] If ϑ is a FGGL2R object-marker, ϑ
′ is a FGGL2R object-marker or term and if one of the
following conditions obtains, then ϑ′ is an instance of ϑ:
St Is.OM,T[FGGL2R].i ϑ
′ results from ϑ by replacing in it all occurrences of a Gothic letter for objects or for
functions respectively with another Gothic letter for objects or for functions which does not occur
within ϑ;
St Is.OM,T[FGGL2R]. ii ϑ
′ results from ϑ by replacing in it all occurrences of a general letter for objects with
a FGGL2R term or object-marker (the same for any occurrence);
St Is.OM,T[FGGL2R]. iii ϑ
′ results from ϑ by replacing in it all occurrences of a COM[FGGL2R] string υ (θ), where υ
is a general letter for first-level functions and θ a COM[FGGL2R] string, which involves the same number
of opening and closing parentheses and within which υ does not occur, with the COM[FGGL2R] string θ′
that results from a FGGL2R function-marker or function-name χ included in FR[1,1] by replacing
in it all occurrences of ‘ξ’ with θ, and continuing this way up to the stage where ϑ is so transformed
that the transformed string involves no COM[FGGL2R] string υ (θ∗), where θ∗ is a COM[FGGL2R] string, in
turn71;
St Is.OM,T[FGGL2R]. iv ϑ
′ results from ϑ by replacing in it all occurrences of a COM[FGGL2R] string υ (θ, θ′), where
υ is a general letter for first-level functions and θ and θ′ are COM[FGGL2R] strings which involve the
same number of opening and closing parentheses and within both of which υ does not occur, with
the COM[FGGL2R] string θ′′ that results from a FGGL2R function-marker or function-name χ included
in FR[2,1] by replacing in it all occurrences of ‘ξ’ with θ and all occurrences of ‘ζ’ with θ′, and
continuing this way up to the stage where ϑ is so transformed that the transformed string involves
no COM[FGGL2R] string υ (θ∗, θ∗∗), where θ∗ and θ∗∗ are COM[FGGL2R] string, in turn72;
St Is.OM,T[FGGL2R].v ϑ
′ results from ϑ by replacing in it all occurrences of a COM[FGGL2R] string Mkβk (θ [βk]),
where θ [βk] is a COM[FGGL2R] string which involves the same number of opening and closing paren-
theses and within which ‘βk’ occurs but ‘Mkβk ’ does not (and k is a certain index), with the
COM[FGGL2R] string θ′ that results from a FGGL2R function-marker or function-name χ included in
FR[1,2] by replacing in it all occurrences of ‘ϕ (θ′′)’ (where θ′′ is a COM[FGGL2R] string which involves
71To take a simple example, suppose that ϑ is ‘f(f(a)) ⇒ g(g(b))’, and take υ (θ) to be ‘f (a)’ and χ to be ‘ξ’. By applying
this clause, one first gets ‘f (a)⇒ g(g(b))’; then, by taking in this last string υ (θ) to be ‘f (a)’, one eventually gets ‘a⇒ g(g(b))’,
which is, then, an instance of ‘f(f(a)) ⇒ g(g(b))’. At this point, one can apply again this same clause by taking ϑ to be
‘a⇒ g(g(b))’ and υ (θ) to be ‘g (b)’. If one takes now χ to be ‘¬ξ’, one gets first ‘a⇒ g(¬b)’, and eventually ‘a⇒ ¬¬b’, which
is, then, an instance of ‘a ⇒ g(g(b))’. This example gives also the occasion for an important clarification. The fact that an
occurrence of the general letters for functions ‘f ’ and ‘g’ occurs within ‘f (f (a))’ and ‘g (g (b))’ within the scope of another
occurrence of them is not problematic at all, since ‘f (a)’ and ‘g (b)’ are FGGL2R object-markers, that is, they are supposed
to indicate values of one-argument first-level functions, and not functions as such. Hence ‘f (f (a))’ and ‘g (g (b))’ also indicate,
unproblematically, values of the same functions. For the same reason, a string like ‘f (g (a))’ presents no problem, being a
perfectly rightful FGGL2R object-marker.
72If υ is a general letter for first-level functions occurring within an object-marker ϑ and υ′ is another such letter, then υ′ (ξ)
and υ′ (ξ, ζ) will be two FGGL2R function-markers. Hence, in this clause and in the previous clause St
Is.OM,T
[FGGL2R]
. iii, χ can
respectively taken to be υ′ (ξ, ζ), and υ′ (ξ).
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the same number of opening and closing parentheses) with the COM[FGGL2R] string θ [θ′′/βk] that
results from θ [βk] by replacing in it ‘βk’ with θ′′, and continuing this way up to the stage where
ϑ is so transformed that the transformed string involves no COM[FGGL2R] string Mkβk ;
St Is.OM,T[FGGL2R]. vi ϑ
′ results from ϑ by replacing in it all occurrences of a COM[FGGL2R] stringMkβk,γk (θ [βk, γk]),
where θ [βk, γk] is a COM[FGGL2R] string which involve the same number of opening and closing paren-
theses and within which ‘βk’ and ‘γk’ occur but ‘Mkβk,γk ’ does not (and k is a certain index), with
the COM[FGGL2R] string θ′ that results from a FGGL2R function-marker or function-name χ included
in FR[2,2] by replacing in it all occurrences of ‘ϕ (θ′′, θ′′′)’ (where θ′′ and θ′′′ are COM[FGGL2R] strings
which involve the same number of opening and closing parentheses) with the COM[FGGL2R] string
θ [θ′′/βk, θ′′′/γk] that results from θ [βk, γk] by replacing in it ‘βk’ with θ′′ and ‘γk’ with θ′′′, and
continuing this way up to the stage where ϑ is so transformed that the transformed string involves
no COM[FGGL2R] string Mkβk,γk 73.
St Is.Clos.[FGGL2R]. i If ϑ
′, ϑ′′ and ϑ′′′ are FGGL2R object-markers or terms such that ϑ′ is an instance of ϑ′′ and
ϑ′′ is an instance of ϑ′′′, then ϑ′ is an instance of ϑ′′′.
St Is.Clos.[FGGL2R]. ii A FGGL2R object-marker or term is an instance of another FGGL2R object-marker or term




4.5 General Statements and Well-Formed Formulas
With the previous definitions at hand, it is finally quite simple to define FGGL2R general statements and
well-formed formulas.
Let us begin by observing that the clauses fixing the procedure generating the families TR and FR[i,j]
implicitly fix the rules according to which the symbols of COM[FGGL2R] have to be composed to give rise to
FGGL2R object-markers. It follows that these stipulations transform this collection in a formal language,
namely LOM[FGGL2R]. Adding to it the symbol ‘ ’, one gets the new language LGS[FGGL2R] = LOM[FGGL2R] ∪ { } to
be used to form FGGL2R statements. These are defined as follows:
St GS[FGGL2R].i If ϑ is a FGGL2R object-marker, then ϑ is a FGGL2R general statement.
St GS[FGGL2R].ii Nothing else is a FGGL2R general statement.
As we have largely anticipated above, FGGL2R general statements are not the only well-formed formulas
of FGGL2R. This is also the case of FGGL2R particular statements:
StWFF[FGGL2R]. i Both FGGL2R particular statements and FGGL2R general statements are FGGL2R well-
formed formulas.
StWFF[FGGL2R]. ii Nothing else is a FGGL2R well-formed formula.
73If k′ is a natural number, Mk′
β
k′
(ϕ (βk′)) and Mk′
β
k′ ,γk′
(ϕ (βk′ , γk′)) will be two FGGL2R function-markers. Hence, in this








that, from the clauses StIs.OM,T[FGGL2R]. ii-vi taken together, it follows that any FGGL2R object-marker is an instance of itself, as it





Insofar as we have already defined the relation of being an instance of, on FGGL2R terms and on FGGL2R
object-markers, we can easily extend this definition to FGGL2R well-formed formula:
St Is.WWF[FGGL2R] A FGGL2R well-formed formula ϑ
′ is an instance of a FGGL2R well-formed formula ϑ if and
only if ϑ′ is an instance of ϑ.
From these stipulations, it follows that any FGGPLR well-formed formula is also a FGGL2R well-formed
formula. One might also verify that the former is an instance of another FGGPLR well-formed formula




It remains that, having defined FGGL2R general statements in the previous way, it is no longer possible
to explain what it means for such a statement to hold by appealing to something as its corresponding
particular statements, as we did for FGGPLR general statements. Admitting that, if ϑ is a FGGL2R
general statement, ϑ is its FGGL2R object-marker, all that can be stipulated is the following:
St As.GS[FGGL2R] A FGGL2R general statement asserts that any object-name that counts as an instance of its
FGGL2R object-marker is a name of T.
St Hld.GS[FGGL2R] A FGGL2R general statement holds if and only if any object-name that counts as an instance
of its FGGL2R object-marker is a name of T.
4.6 Axioms and Theorems
According to this last stipulation and the meaning assigned to the functions ∀aϕ (a), ∀fµβ,γ (f (β, γ)), and
∀fµβ (f (β)), is it easy to see that the three following FGGL2R general statements:
Ax[FGGL2R].IIa ‘ ∀a1f(a1)⇒ f(a)’
Ax[FGGL2R].IIb ‘ ∀f1Mβ (f1 (β))⇒Mβ (f (β))’










refer to T whatever objects, one-argument first-level function, and one-argument second-level function ‘Γ’,
‘∆’, ‘Φ (ξ)’, and ‘Ωβ (ϕ (β))’ might respectively designate. These statements render Frege’s Basic Laws IIa,
IIb and III ([18], §§ I.20, I.25, and I.47)74 Let us take them, together with Ax[FGGPLR].I, and Ax[FGGPLR].IV,
as the axioms of FGGL2R.
These axioms having been stated, it is now time to define the relation of following from, on FGGL2R
well-formed formulas. This is to be done, of course, in a quite different way than for FGGPLR well-formed
formulas, that is, without appealing to any sort of correspondence between two different sorts of FGGL2R
statements.
To this purpose, one has to begin by adapting the rules RlPS[FGGPLR]. i -viii so as to get new deductive
rules applicable to FGGPLR well-formed formulas. This is easily done by simply replacing in these rules any
occurrence of ‘FGGPLR particular statement(s)’ with an occurrence of ‘FGGL2R well-formed formula(s)’,
and any occurrence of ‘FGGPLR term(s)’ with an occurrence of ‘FGGL2R term(s) or object-marker(s)’. Call
‘RlWWF[FGGL2R]. i -viii ’ the rules obtained in this way.
To these eight rules, two others are to be added:
74On Basic Laws IIa and IIb, cf. footnote 64, above.
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RlWFF[FGGL2R]. ix If τ is a FGGL2R general letter for objects and ϑ, κ1, κ2, . . . , κn, are FGGL2R terms or
object-markers such that τ does occur within ϑ but not in κ1, κ2, . . . , κn, ‘ak’ occurs neither within
ϑ nor within κ1, κ2, . . . , κn, and ϑ[ak/τ ] (where ‘k’ is any index) results from ϑ by replacing in it all
occurrences of τ with ‘ak’, and ‘−→κ ⇒’ behaves as ‘−→κi ⇒’ (i = 1, 2) in rule RlPS[FGGPLR]. iii, then:
−→κ ⇒ ϑ
————————————−→κ ⇒ ∀akϑ[ak/τ ]
RlWFF[FGGL2R]. x If υ is a FGGL2R general letter for first-level functions and ϑ, κ1, κ2, . . . , κn, ϑ[fk/υ] are
FGGL2R terms or object-markers such that υ does occurs within ϑ but not in κ1, κ2, . . . , κn, ‘fk’
occurs neither within ϑ nor within κ1, κ2, . . . , κn, and ϑ[fk/υ] (where ‘k’ is any index) results from
ϑ by replacing in it all occurrences of υ with ‘fk’, and ‘−→κ ⇒’ behaves as ‘−→κi ⇒’ (i = 1, 2) in rule
RlPS[FGGPLR]. iii, then: −→κ ⇒ ϑ
————————————−→κ ⇒ ∀fkϑ[fk/υ]
These rules are rules of transformation of FGGL2R well-formed formulas, and are close to the modern
rules of first- and second-order universal generalisation respectively. They render Frege’s rule of “transfor-
mation of a Roman letter to a Gothic letter”([18], §§ I.17, I.20 and I.48.5; [22], pp. 321, 351, and 621).
At this point, one can proceed just as for FGGL2R particular statements, and generalise the relation of
following from, so as to allow a FGGL2R well-formed formula to follow from any number of such formulas,
and fix the notion of a theorem of FGGL2R in the obvious way:
St Flw,WFF[FGGL2R]. i If θ, ϑ and τ are FGGL2R well-formed formulas, τ respectively follows from θ, or
from θ and ϑ, if it respectively immediately follows from them (according to the rules RlWFF[FGGL2R].
i-x );
St Flw.WFF[FGGL2R]. ii If τ , θi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n), ϑi (i = 1, 2, . . . ,m) are FGGL2R well-formed formulas, τ
follows from θ1, θ2, . . . , θn, and θ1 follows from ϑ1, . . . , ϑm, then τ follows from ϑ1, . . . ,
ϑm, θ2, . . . , θn.
StFlw.WFF[FGGL2R].iii No FGGL2R well-formed formula follows from any number of other FGGL2R well-formed




StTh[FGGL2R] A FGGL2R well-formed formula is a theorem of FGGL2R if and only if it follows from some or all
of the FGGL2R well-formed formulas: Ax[FGGPLR].I , Ax[FGGL2R].II.a, Ax[FGGL2R].II.b, Ax[FGGL2R].III
and Ax[FGGPLR].IV.
Since Ax[FGGPLR].I is also an axiom of FGGL2R, and the rules Rl
WFF
[FGGL2R]
. i-viii parallel the rules
RlGS[FGGPLR]. i-viii, any theorem of FGGPLR is also a theorem of FGGL2R. Hence, insofar as FGGPLR is
complete, and FGGL2R is clearly sound, the latter can be taken as a conservative extension of the former,
though we have not come to it by mere extension. This apparently cumbersome situation depends on
FGGPLR including as its well-formed formulas only its general statements, which do not include terms, in




Both FGGPLR and FGGL2R are not only quite different in nature from any modern system of propositional
and second-order logic. They are also quite convoluted, even uselessly convoluted, one could think. This
depends both on Frege’s conception of logic, quite different with the one which is widely accepted today,
and on the successive finding of a number of possible simplifications, many of which are connected to the
abandonment of the use of functions to express predication, and could not have, then, been possible in
Frege’s setting, dominated by the primitive opposition of objects and functions.
This is why we have not tried to simplify our systems. This would have made them unfaithful to Frege’s
conceptions, to which we have, rather, tried to stay as close as possible. Our aim was not to show how
the propositional and second-order fragments of FGGBS could be amended (which is something that the
successive development of logic has clearly shown), but to provide a reconstruction suitable for making the
consequences of this conception as clear as possible for a modern reader, also, and overall, for the aspects of
it that could today appear as quite archaic.
In discussing Frege’s logic, it is usual to emphasise its contentual nature and the absence of a clear
distinction between its syntax and its semantics. We are far from undermining the importance of these
aspects. We have discussed them, and they are reflected in our systems. Nonetheless, we have considered
useful to focus on other features of this logic, most of which do not directly depend on them, being rather
connected with more general views.
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